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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines, evaluates, and prescribes improvements to a familiar form of constitutional construction 
favored by neoformalists—the preference for rules over standards.  Constitutional law development can be 
understood as being composed of two judicial tasks—interpretation and construction.  Judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution involves determining the semantic meaning of the words contained in the document.  Once that 
semantic meaning is determined, the interpreted meaning must be constructed into legal doctrine for application in 
court.  Sometimes, that construction involves the articulation of the legal doctrines based on the interpreted 
constitutional text that will govern a particular case and those similar to it.  Legal neoformalists and legal realists 
disagree as to how this latter form of construction should occur—the former preferring rules and the latter preferring 
standards—but this portion of the “construction zone” is where the rules-versus-standards debate resides.  This 
Article refers to the formalist, or “rules,” side of the debate as neoformalist constitutional 
construction.  Neoformalist constitutional construction has many critics and defenders. But few, if any, scholarly 
treatments seek to evaluate it in the real world of judging, or seek to tease out its ideal conditions.  This Article 
fills that gap by examining neoformalist constitutional construction on its own terms—whether it actually serves 
neoformalist values, and under what conditions it might do so optimally.  Employing a case study, this Article 
shows that neoformalist constitutional construction is bound to fail, absent changes to two judicial practices: one, 
the inordinate deference that lower courts grant to Supreme Court dicta; and two, the tendency of Supreme Court 
justices to over-justify their rulings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal theory can be organized around many ongoing disputes.  One of 
the most well-known is the dispute between legal formalists and legal realists.  
This dispute has both descriptive and normative dimensions.1  The 
descriptive dimension involves explanations for judicial decisions, pitting 
judging based on applying objective legal sources to facts against judging that 
is influenced by extra-legal factors, such as policy, politics, fairness, and 
institutional concerns.2  The normative dimension has at least two prominent 
strands—one that involves interpretative methodologies, and another that 
involves the judicial craft—how judges should frame and compose their 
decisions.3  In constitutional law, the former dimension plays out through 
debates over originalism versus living constitutionalism.  The latter pits the 
preference for appellate judges to set forth their holdings in categorical rules 
 
 1 See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism, 1–2, 9–10 (Stanford Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working 
Paper No. 4, 1999), https://ssrn.com/abstract=200732 (last visited March 6, 2018) (contrasting 
the discredited descriptive dimension with four versions of the normative dimension).  
 2 See, e.g., BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 200–02 (2010) (critiquing 
the distinction and arguing for a more nuanced view of the history of the formalist/realist debate); 
Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 122 (2010) 
(reviewing and critiquing Tamanaha’s book, but agreeing with the point that “mechanical 
jurisprudence,” or what Leiter terms “vulgar formalism,” was not a widely-held view, even in 
formalism’s early heyday). 
 3 See Grey, supra note 1, at 2 (terming the former “originalism” and the latter “objectivism”).   
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against the preference for more flexible standards—the “rules versus 
standards” debate.4   
The descriptive dimension of formalism in its least flexible form—that of 
so-called “mechanical jurisprudence”—has been discredited, if it ever truly 
existed in the first place.5  But both strands of the normative dimension of 
formalism are very much alive, and have recently been placed under the 
label, neoformalism.6  Many scholars have addressed, and continue to address, 
the interpretive strand of the normative dimension, mostly through 
scholarship on constitutional originalism,7 and responses to this scholarship. 
This Article, however, focuses attention on the judicial craft strand, taking as 
its starting point Justice Antonin Scalia’s most influential articulation and 
defense of this strand’s values.8   
Justice Scalia’s “law of rules” formulation—which prefers that appellate 
judges set down categorical rules, rather than more flexible standards, where 
possible—occupies a particular place within the originalist methodology of 
which he was also a strong proponent.9  Originalist scholars have shown that 
constitutional law development can be understood as being composed of two 
judicial tasks—interpretation and construction.10  Judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution, for most modern originalists, at least, involves determining 
the semantic meaning of the words contained in the document.  Once that 
semantic meaning is determined, the interpreted meaning must be 
constructed into legal doctrine for application in court.11   
 
 4 See id. at 2–3 (arguing that there is tension between the textualist/originalist desire to comport with 
original meaning which could require the use of standards, versus the objectivist’s desire for clear rules).   
 5 See infra Section II.A.   
 6 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, 
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 187–88 (2006) (outlining the idea of 
neoformalism and distinguishing it from the earlier, discredited form); see also Grey, supra note 1, at 
2 (same).  
 7 See infra Section II.A and sources cited therein. 
 8 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989) 
(discussing a preference for predictability in judicial decisions and for the use of firm rules).  
 9 See id. at 1184 (linking the two explicitly).   
 10 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004) (claiming constitutional construction is required because of the limits stemming 
from the document itself); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) (charting the history of originalism); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) (claiming that 
constitutional construction is both ubiquitous and inevitable).  This distinction was originally 
derived from contract theory, but it has become a staple of originalist reasoning.  See  Solum, supra 
at 467 (describing the birth of the “New Originalism,” and its incorporation of the distinction).   
 11 See Solum, supra note 10, at 468–69 (“In some cases, giving the text legal effect might be unmediated; 
we read the text and put it into effect.  But in other cases, the legal effect of the text is mediated by 
doctrines of constitutional law.  The text of the First Amendment includes the phrase ‘freedom of 
speech’ but constitutional decisions are mediated by a plethora of constitutional doctrines, 
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Sometimes, that construction involves gap filling or the resolution of 
vagueness, ambiguity, or other under-determinacy in the semantic meaning 
of the text.12  Other times, it involves the articulation of the legal doctrines 
based on the constitutional text that will govern a particular case and those 
similar to it.13  Legal formalists and legal realists disagree as to how this latter 
form of construction should occur—the former preferring rules and the latter 
preferring standards14—but this portion of the “construction zone” is where 
the rules-versus-standards debate resides.  Accordingly, this Article will refer 
to the formalist, or “rules,” side of the debate as neoformalist constitutional 
construction.15  
The literature contains many critiques of neoformalist constitutional 
construction,16 along with some defenses of it on normative grounds from 
commentators other than Justice Scalia.17  But few, if any, scholarly 
treatments seek to evaluate neoformalist constitutional construction in the 
real world of judging, or to tease out its ideal conditions.18  This Article fills 
that gap by examining neoformalist constitutional construction on its own 
terms—whether it actually causes the predictability, uniformity of 
application, and cabining of extra-legal factors in judicial decision making 
 
including, for example, rules against prior restraints, rules governing public forums, and a complex 
doctrine governing obscenity.  When  courts  devise  these  doctrines  as  part  of  the  process  of  
determining  the  legal  effect  of  the  ‘freedom  of  speech,’  they  are  engaging  in  constitutional  
construction—in  the sense stipulated here.”).  
 12 Id. at 469–72 (outlining several different forms of under-determinacy). 
 13 Id. at 474 (defining “Constitutional Construction” as “[a]n activity that is part of constitutional 
practice and aims at the determination of the legal content of constitutional doctrine and/or the 
legal effect to be give the constitutional text.”).   
 14 Grey, supra note 1, at 2, 9.   
 15 In truth, developing categorical rules is one part of neoformalist constitutional construction, with 
the others being more contested, and at times shading away from originalism and neoformalism 
and toward living constitutionalism and legal realism.  See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the 
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 724–25, 738–39 (2011) (pointing out that originalist construction, 
as a way of resolving under-determinacy in the text, can shade into living constitutionalism); Martin 
H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic 
Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1509–10 (2012) (same).  
For that reason, only the “rules vs. standards” question is examined here under this label, though 
other forms of construction certainly fit within its bounds.   
 16 See, e.g., Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism 
and Liberalism, 19 PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 175 (2010) (refuting the proposition that clear rules are more 
advantageous than vague standards).   
 17 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism: The Rule of Criminal Law as a Law of 
Rules, in 187 HERITAGE FOUND. SPECIAL REP., THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: 
REMEMBERING A CONSERVATIVE LEGAL TITAN’S IMPACT ON THE LAW 5 (Elizabeth H. Slattery 
ed., 2016), available at https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/the-legacy-justice-antonin-scalia-
remembering-conservative-legal-titans-impact-the (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (praising Justice 
Scalia’s neoformalist criminal law jurisprudence).   
 18 Raban, supra note 16, at 186, appears to come the closest, but his analysis is a conceptual one, rather 
than a case study, as here, that tracks a change from a standards regime to a rule regime, and thus 
can draw comparative conclusions.   
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that it promises, and under what conditions it might do so optimally.     
Part I develops the theory of neoformalist constitutional construction and 
situates it within the primary neoformalist theory of constitutional judging, 
which prominently relies on an “interpretation-construction distinction.”  
Part I also identifies the assumptions about judging and judicial behavior 
underlying neoformalist constitutional construction, illustrating that the 
normative theory is at least partially based on a realist descriptive account of 
judging, tempered by a formalist optimism about judicial behavior.  It then 
connects these assumptions with the thorny problem of distinguishing the 
holding of a case from its dicta.  Understanding this connection is vital to 
understanding the success or failure of neoformalist constitutional 
construction.   
Next, in Part II, the Article reviews its test case, Garcetti v. Ceballos,19 a case 
which made a profound alteration to the doctrine of public employee free 
speech rights.20  This case is selected because it is nearly universally viewed 
as an example of what this Article terms neoformalist constitutional 
construction.21  The case employs a categorical rule of decision in a doctrinal 
space that previously was governed only by a balancing test standard.22  That 
is, it openly and deliberately pursues the values and employs the principal 
method of neoformalist constitutional construction.  
Part II analyzes the Garcetti decision in detail, isolating its holding from 
both the dicta found in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and the many 
propositions and characterizations of the Court’s decision found in the 
dissents.  Building on this analysis, Part III shows that the use of a categorical 
rule to resolve Garcetti and to cabin lower court decision making in the public 
employee speech context was defensible in its conception, but in its 
implementation led to judicial behavior diametrically opposed to what 
neoformalist theory would have predicted.   
Part IV then postulates a reason for this unexpected result, along with a 
prescription for reform.  Neoformalist constitutional construction cannot 
 
 19 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 20 See generally Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 262 ED. L. REP. 357 (2011) (reviewing the then-extant Court of Appeals 
decisions applying Garcetti in the public education context and finding a marked trend toward 
reduced speech rights for public educational employees).   
 21 See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal 
Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 1173, 1194–98 (2007) (criticizing Garcetti for creating a 
formalist rule with “an underlying categorization that is more ambiguous than the prior standard”); 
Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment 
Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 911–912 (2011) (classifying Garcetti as a neoformalist decision).   
 22 See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (arguing that the Court should not have replaced 
the Pickering-Connick balancing inquiry with the Garcetti test). 
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succeed at serving its professed values unless the lower courts observe and 
adhere to the categorical rules that the Supreme Court adopts, but the 
analysis of Part IV shows that this adherence is impaired due to two flaws in 
the Supreme Court’s decision making.23  One is the Court’s failure to 
anticipate or appreciate the inordinate deference the lower courts grant to 
the Court’s extraneous rhetoric—its dicta,24 and the compounding effect of 
the Court’s overjustifying its rulings, which it did in Garcetti.  The other is the 
failure of the lower courts to properly appreciate their duty to act as a check 
on the Court’s power from below, by adhering to strong stare decisis norms.  
These two problems must be solved for neoformalist constitutional 
construction to succeed on its own terms.  Absent such changes, and 
especially in developing rights-limiting speech doctrines, as in Garcetti, the 
Court should prefer standards to rules.   
I.  NEOFORMALIST JUDGING 
The debates between legal formalists and legal realists form some of the 
most important, capacious, and longstanding disputes in legal theory.  In 
constitutional law, the disputes take both descriptive and normative forms, 
and each of these forms has more than one dimension, with each of these 
dimensions forming several sub-disputes.  This Part briefly summarizes these 
forms and dimensions, situating the rules-standards debate that is the subject 
of this Article in its proper place within the overall “formalist-realist divide.”25  
A.  Judging in the “Construction Zone” 
Broadly, the descriptive form of the formalist-realist debate pits 
depictions of judging as mostly a rule-application process, where extra-legal 
factors (i.e., those outside the facts of the case and the governing law) do little 
to no adjudicatory work, against depictions of judging as a process involving 
 
 23 In addition to the flaws in judicial practices Part IV identifies, it is surely true that political 
preferences, strategic thinking, and other explanations might be identified as impediments to rule-
following in the lower courts.  Neoformalist constitutional construction is in part directed at 
minimizing, or even eliminating, these influences.  If it does not do so, then it may be true that flaws 
in the judicial craft and judicial practices are to blame, as posited here, or it may be true that 
political ideology, strategic thinking, and other explanations are simply insurmountable elements 
of judging.  This Article proceeds from the former, more optimistic, view and leaves the evaluation 
of that view to later empirical research.   
 24 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1274–75 
(2006) (arguing that, contrary to common judicial practice, lower courts “may not treat the 
Supreme Court’s dictum as dispositive”); Scalia, supra note 8, at 1177 (taking it as given that lower 
courts give deference to the Supreme Court’s “mode of analysis” in particular cases, regardless of the 
“the theoretical scope of a ‘holding’”). 
 25 See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 1–3 (coining this term to name the overall debate).   
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both legal and extra-legal factors, such as politics, policy, judicial attitudes, 
institutional norms, and other considerations, each of which might drive the 
decision under the right circumstances.26   
Descriptive legal formalists—mostly the group known as the “classic” 
legal formalists of the late nineteenth century—posited that judging is (at least 
mostly) a rule-application process, and that judges in most cases apply known 
legal standards to resolve each case on its unique facts27—Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “umpire” analogy is the popularized version of this theory.28  
Descriptive legal realists, including the recently burgeoning group of 
empirical social scientists studying judicial decision making, see judging as 
much more (or even completely) influenced by factors outside the facts of the 
case before the court and the applicable law.29  Their accounts have shown 
that societal factors, judicial political preferences, collegial “peer” effects, and 
institutional concerns, among other influences, have effects on the outcomes 
of cases.30   
As a descriptive matter, few today dispute that the legal realists have the 
better case, at least when the subject of analysis is the appellate courts.  Very 
few dispute the mountains of empirical evidence that stand in support of the 
proposition that appellate judging is not merely about the facts of a case and 
the applicable law, but also involves nonlegal factors both intrinsic to the 
judge (e.g., political leanings) and extrinsic to the judge (e.g., the institutional 
role orientations of collegial court judges).31   
The normative form of the debate has three primary dimensions, all 
today grouped under the label, “neoformalism.”32  The interpretive 
 
 26 Id.   
 27 Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (1999).   
 28 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr, Nominee, 
Chief Justice of the United States).  As far as I can tell, the first use of the adjectival form of “umpire” 
in legal scholarship was Judge Marvin Frankel’s.  See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An 
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).  Many have criticized the Chief Justice’s formulation, 
see, e.g., Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 113, 124–25 (2010) (arguing that, although trial court judges resemble umpires in 
many ways, Supreme Court Justices are better compared to the Commissioner of Baseball); see also 
Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (2009) 
(listing articles that critique the analogy in this way); Zelinsky, supra, at 113 n.4 (same), but it 
certainly speaks to one popular conception of the proper judicial role.  That conception is 
descriptively formalist.   
 29 See generally WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND 
WHAT’S AT STAKE (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (collecting scholarship on the topic).   
 30 See generally Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002) (commenting extensively on the state 
of the scholarship and predicting emerging directions).   
 31 Id. at 833–39, 841–42.   
 32 See Solum, supra note 6.   
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dimension involves the proper methods for deriving meaning from legal 
sources, and this dimension has received a great deal of recent attention from 
originalist constitutional law scholars, along with their theoretical 
opponents.33  The applicative dimension encourages lower courts to strive to 
apply clear rules from prior precedent and constitutional or statutory text, 
rather than to seek fulfillment of extra-legal goals, such as fairness or 
pragmatism.34  The constructive dimension encourages courts to fill 
interpretive gaps in fidelity to the text and structure of authoritative sources, 
and to develop doctrines of application wherever possible as rules, rather 
than as standards.35   
Interpretive neoformalists favor objective and predictable means of 
interpretation.  In the area of constitutional law, they generally favor some 
form of originalist reasoning.36  They generally believe that the text of the 
Constitution, read in light of the meaning that educated readers of that text 
would have understood contemporaneously to its adoption, can supply the 
necessary content to resolve most constitutional questions.37  In other words, 
interpretive legal formalists reject the proposition that the Constitution 
should be construed against its objectively determinable meaning to do 
justice, conform with contemporary values, or serve important policy 
concerns.  Interpretive legal realists, in contrast, generally favor some 
combination of methods that includes considerations of justice, 
contemporary public policy, and contemporary social standards in 
interpreting constitutional text, and this method is therefore often labeled as 
“living constitutionalism.”38   
 
 33 Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 418–20 
(2013) (defending originalism as an interpretive theory), and Lawrence Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 524–36 (2013) (same), with Bret Boyce, 
Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 947–50 (1998) (critiquing 
originalism on indeterminacy grounds), and Redish & Arnould, supra note 15, at 1511 (critiquing 
originalism on conceptual clarity grounds).  
 34 See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Legal Formalism, Procedural Principles, and Judicial Constraint in American 
Adjudication, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 23, 24 (Laura 
Pineschi ed., 2015) (defining Justice Scalia’s formalism as “the idea that judges and other 
decisionmakers should decide particular cases, to the extent possible, by the mechanical application 
of existing legal rules.”). 
 35 See Grey, supra note 1, at 2 (situating rule articulation within neoformalism).  See generally Randy E. 
Barnett & Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018) 
(developing a theory based on fidelity to text and structure).   
 36 See Barnett, supra note 10, at 620–21 (outlining the shift from originalism to new originalism); Grey, 
supra note 1, at 1–2 (explaining the four main sects of neoformalist constitutional interpretation); 
Solum, supra note 6, at 187–88 (providing an overview of originalism’s history). 
 37 Solum, supra note 33, at 456–57 (understanding new originalism as a theory concerned with the 
public meaning at the time of framing and ratification). 
 38 See Solum, supra note 6, at 156 (explaining that legal realism generally eschews stare decisis in favor 
of policy or balancing relevant interests).   
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The primary objection to originalism from living constitutionalists is that 
the Constitution’s text often has a semantic meaning that is vague, 
ambiguous, or otherwise under-determinate.  The response of originalists to 
this critique has been to draw from contract law theory and divide 
constitutional meaning-making into two phases: interpretation and 
construction.39   
Interpretation involves deriving the semantic context of legally operative 
texts—for purposes of this discussion, the Constitution.40  The currently 
dominant group of originalists sees the original, publicly-understood 
meaning of the words the Framers used as the best guide to this semantic 
content.  Today’s originalists generally concede that this semantic content 
will sometimes be under-determinate of the legal question before the court, 
though they disagree as to how often this will be so, and what to do when the 
under-determinacy problem presents itself. 41   
One prominent strand of originalists favors a second step at this point:  
construction.42  Whereas interpretation involves determining the semantic 
meaning of the text, construction involves determining the legal 
consequences of that meaning.  Where the meaning is not fully determined 
through interpretation, construction attempts to complete the meaning using 
other sources, such as structure and extant precedent.43  Where the meaning 
is fully determined, or once these additional sources have completed the 
meaning-making job, construction uses that meaning to develop rules of 
decision for a pending case and those cases similar to it that will arise in the 
 
 39 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 35, at 1 (arguing that judges enter into a fiduciary relationship 
with private citizens when they take their oath to uphold the Constitution, requiring them to engage 
in interpretation and construction, seeking to give legal effect to both the “letter” and “spirit” of the 
Constitution); Solum, supra note 33, at 457 (defining “constitutional interpretation” as “the activity 
that discerns the communicative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text” and 
“constitutional construction” as “the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine 
and the legal effect of the constitutional text”). 
 40 See Solum, supra note 33, at 459 (defining this as “Public Meaning Originalism,” the idea that “the 
communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of the origin by the 
conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the context that was shared by the 
drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.”).  
 41 See id. at 464 (defending the grouping of originalist strands together even though they may disagree 
about how best to ground the theory).  
 42 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 35, at 3 (arguing New Originalism diverges from Old Originalism 
by separating “interpretation” from “construction”).   
 43 See Solum, supra note 33, at 457 (defining construction as “the activity that determines the content 
of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text”).  It is not the purpose of 
this Article to take issue with this activity being placed under the label of “construction,” but one 
could make the case that, because the various ways of resolving under-determinacy in text are all 
aimed at meaning-making, they are all more usefully termed “interpretation,” leaving only the 
judicial doctrinal choices this Article engages for the “construction zone.”  Later work will attempt 
to tease out these distinctions further. 
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future.44  All of this additional work has been described as existing in a 
“construction zone”—a space where constitutional meaning either is under-
determined or is fully determined by text and/or precedent and must now 
be applied to an actual case through a rule of decision.45   
This latter, doctrinal-development dimension focuses more on the 
judicial craft than on the meaning of legally authoritative texts, and it is the 
subject of the inquiry this Article undertakes.46  That inquiry properly begins 
with the assumptions underlying the preference for rules over standards in 
doctrine development.   
Neoformalists, most recently represented on the Court by Justice Antonin 
Scalia,47 seem to concede the descriptive legal realist case that judging is often 
influenced by factors beyond the facts of a case before a court and the 
applicable law, but also seem to be very troubled by this fact.48  These 
scholars and judges see value in a system of law that is as predictable and 
uniform in its application as possible, and they see value in placing limits on 
the discretion of judges to achieve these ends.  Accordingly, they advocate 
that articulating clear, inflexible legal rules in appellate courts that can simply 
be applied in the lower courts has the best potential to minimize the effect of 
extra-legal factors on judging.49  Simply put, if a judge has fewer (or no) 
degrees of freedom in arriving at a decision, then there will be less (or no) 
room for extra-legal factors to operate, resulting in greater predictability, at 
least for those who take the time to educate themselves on the law.  As applied 
to constitutional law, we might term this judicial craftwork, neoformalist 
constitutional construction.   
 
 
 44 Solum, supra note 6, at 208 (arguing that it is a “realist caricature of formalism” to see formalism as 
treating all precedents as if they possessed the power to guide the Court without any need for reason 
and judgment). 
 45 Solum, supra note 33, at 458.  
 46 In truth, developing categorical rules is one part of neoformalist constitutional construction, with 
the others being more contested, and at times shading away from originalism and neoformalism 
and toward living constitutionalism and legal realism.  See, e.g., Colby, supra note 15, at 763–64 
(pointing out that originalist construction, as a way of resolving under-determinacy in the text, can 
shade into living constitutionalism); Redish & Arnould, supra note 15, at 1509–10 (same).  For that 
reason, only the “rules vs. standards” question is examined here under this label, though other 
forms of construction certainly fit within its bounds. 
 47 See Scalia, supra note 8, at 1187 (“All I urge is that [standards-based] modes of analysis be avoided 
where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question 
allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind 
that when we have finally reached the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of 
the circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law.”).   
 48 See id. at 1186–1187 (explaining how the law will always have need of balancing tests and totality of 
the circumstances tests).   
 49 Id. at 1187.  
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Legal realists, represented recently on the Court by, among others,50 
Justice Stephen Breyer,51 see futility in attempting to reduce legal doctrine to 
a system of easily applicable rules, and therefore usually52 favor an approach 
to judicial lawmaking that relies on flexible standards that allow for the 
consideration of unique facts and equities, or a balancing of interests.  The 
virtue of this approach, it is generally agreed, is that, as each case comes to 
court, the judge is empowered to seek a result that is more fair and just, in 
light of the unique facts of the case.   
As Justice Breyer points out, developing bright-line rules can be helpful 
to lower courts and litigants, but there will always be cases that fall on the 
wrong side of a bright line, and judges should have the ability to seek just 
results in such cases, considering not only the text, structure, and legislative 
history of the law in light of the facts of the case, but also its purpose and its 
likely socio-legal consequences.53  Justice Scalia’s response to this line of 
argument forms the theoretical basis for neoformalist constitutional 
construction.   
B.  “Law of Rules” Values 
In his famous article defending the “rules” side of the rules-standards 
debate, Justice Scalia set forth two primary goals, along with a preferred 
method for achieving these goals.54  The goals of any constructive doctrine 
development exercise, according to Justice Scalia, should be the fostering of 
predictability in the law, such that legal actors may order their conduct to 
avoid running afoul of legal standards; and fostering the uniform application 
of the law in the lower courts, such that legal disputants will be able to 
formulate expectations of how their cases will come out once litigated.55   
 
 50 See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 1087, 1092–93 (1989) (arguing that Justice Stevens holds a legal realist view on judicial 
deliberation). 
 51 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from the Supreme Court, 8 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 99 (2006) (“I believe that no single theory can provide answers to all of 
the questions that come before us as judges.  Perhaps I have reached this conclusion because, unlike 
many judges, I am prepared to live with uncertainty and ambiguity.  Critics do not like this 
approach because they want a bright-line rule and the guidance that a bright-line rule provides.  
While a bright-line rule often provides some guidance, when many cases come near the edges of 
the bright-line rule it can provide little or no guidance at all.”).   
 52 The word “usually” is used here and in the discussion of Justice Scalia below because, as others 
have pointed out, the Justices certainly do (or did, in the case of Justice Scalia) deviate from their 
professed philosophies.  See, e.g., William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1138–39 & 1139 n.37 (1992) (offering examples of 
Justice Scalia’s diversions from his positions).   
 53 Id. 
 54 See generally Scalia, supra note 8. 
 55 Id. at 1178–79.   
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The mechanism that Justice Scalia favored for fostering these two ideals 
was the cabining of judicial discretion thorough the promulgation of 
categorical rules of decision in the appellate courts wherever possible.56  
Underlying this proposal, as outlined above, is the descriptive legal realist 
assumption that judges, left with too many degrees of decisional freedom, will 
decide cases based on extra-legal factors, or will misapply the law to achieve 
their own preferred outcomes.57  But it should be obvious that also underlying 
Justice Scalia’s preferred method for counteracting this behavior is the 
descriptive legal formalist assumption that judges will follow and faithfully 
apply a categorical rule once articulated.    
In other words, the constructive strand of neoformalism depends on the 
applicative strand—the cabining of judicial discretion that is vital to the 
achievement of legal predictability and uniformity of application cannot 
happen in a regime devoid of strong stare decisis norms, including both a 
norm of following binding precedent from higher courts and a norm of 
critically analyzing prior appellate decisions to determine just what is binding 
in them, and what is dicta.  Through the application of a strong distinction 
between holding and dicta, the lower courts cabin their own discretion, and 
they make possible the success of categorical rules.  Absent this application, 
a categorical rule becomes no more than a suggestion or a starting point for 
judicial adventurism.  Adherence in the lower courts to a strong distinction 
between holding and dicta is therefore a necessary assumption grounding the 
neoformalist values of fostering predictability and uniformity, which 
themselves ground the neoformalist preference for rules over standards in 
most cases.  If that descriptive legal formalist assumption does not hold, then 
neoformalist constitutional construction cannot succeed.   
C.  The Thorny Problem of Holding and Dicta 
The requirement to adhere to controlling precedent is a foundational 
aspect of the United States legal system, and one that distinguishes common-
law systems such as those in the United States and England from civil law 
systems, such as are prevalent in Continental Europe.58  Indeed, within forty-
 
 56 Id. at 1187.   
 57 See id. at 1180 (“It is a commonplace that the one effective check upon arbitrary judges is criticism 
by the bar and the academy.  But it is no more possible to demonstrate the inconsistency of two 
opinions based upon a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test than it is to demonstrate the inconsistency 
of two jury verdicts.  Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”). 
 58 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1186 
(2006) (“Reliance on precedent seems here to stay, as even its fiercest critics regretfully concede.”); 
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000) (arguing that at 
least the consideration of precedent from a court at the same level as the deciding court is a 
constitutional compulsion, and pointing out the distinction in approaches between common law 
and civil law systems); Solum, supra note 6, at 156–57, 186–189 (2006) (distinguishing between the 
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eight hours of the first law school class, a law student in a common law 
jurisdiction likely understands the simple concept that lower courts must 
apply the “holdings” set down by higher courts in cases embracing 
appropriately similar facts, and may treat as merely persuasive the “dicta” 
found in these opinions.       
A good deal of research—some ancient, some very recent—focuses on 
the surprising difficulty that both courts and scholars have in distinguishing 
the holding of a case from its dicta.59  Although this literature is voluminous, 
the competing accounts of how we should separate holding from dicta can 
be usefully grouped into two schools of thought.  One school, which I will 
dub the traditionalist school, seeks ways of determining the holdings of prior 
cases that grant little to no deference to the deciding judges in those cases, 
particularly as to which facts were material to those judges’ decisions in the 
cases.60  This school represents by far the most influential view of the 
distinction, one which remains enshrined in the definitions of the terms 
“judicial dictum” and “obiter dictum” in Black’s Law Dictionary.61   
This approach is associated with the nineteenth century work of Professor 
Wambaugh, who viewed a holding as the court’s decision or disposition, plus 
all statements in the case “necessary” to the decision.62  Professor Wambaugh 
operationalized his view through a simple “but-for” test: to determine 
whether a judicial statement is part of the holding or is dicta, one should 
simply ask whether, absent the statement in question, the decision could be 
 
Supreme Court’s responsibilities relating to its own precedent, which it is free to overrule, and lower 
courts’ responsibilities relating to the same precedent, which they are bound to follow, and arguing 
that the Supreme Court’s should more strictly adhere to its own precedents).  
 59 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959–60 
(2005) (developing a new test for determining the actual holding of a case and applying the test to 
several familiar constitutional law cases); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It 
Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2010) (arguing that faulty attention to judicial 
statements—what courts say—as opposed to actual holdings—what courts do, leads to the elevation 
of dicta to binding precedent); see also Leval, supra note 24, at 1250  (“Although I think most agree 
in the abstract with the proposition that dictum does not establish binding law, this rule is honored 
in the breach with alarming frequency.”); Solum, supra note 6, at 186–89 (reviewing the realist-
formalist debates over the proper conception of a judicial holding). 
 60 The most comprehensive account of these various accounts is that of Abramowicz & Stearns, supra 
note 59.  Abramowicz and Stearns do not divide the schools of thought as I do, but their analysis 
accounts for the same distinction, and their own proposed method does an admirable job of 
attempting to bridge the differences between these competing accounts.   
 61 Judicial Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“An opinion by a court on a question 
that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that 
is not essential to the decision.”); Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“A 
judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered 
persuasive).—Often shortened to dictum or, less commonly, obiter.”).   
 62 EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 13 (2d ed. 1894).   
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the same.63  If so, the statement in question is dicta.   
The principal problem with this approach is its inability to deal with 
alternative justifications for the same outcome.  Where such alternative 
justifications exist, applying Wambaugh’s test would reveal that neither was 
strictly necessary to the outcome.  Accordingly, each would be viewed by 
Wambaugh as dicta, leaving the case without any holdings.64  Another 
problem is the fact that courts often do not resolve a case on the narrowest 
grounds conceivable, so it will often be possible to whittle down a court’s 
actual holding to a narrower one than the court intended through 
speculation, and this possibility may leave later courts and academics, rather 
than the deciding court, in control of the scope of the decision.65   
Another non-deferential view, offered in response to Wambaugh’s and 
more amenable to the alternative holdings problem, sought to arrive at a 
sufficient post hoc factual and legal justification for the outcome of the case.66  
Professor Dorf has argued that this approach sought to “reconcile” the 
principles of law stated in the case with the facts of the case.67  Professors 
Abramowicz and Stearns term this theory the “facts-plus-outcome” 
approach or the “reconciliation” approach. This approach went beyond the 
strictly “necessary” proposition to include within the holding all statements 
that could be reconciled with the decision, in light of the facts of the case (or 
in Dworkinian terms, the propositions which “fit and justify” it).68   Due to 
the tendency of later courts to focus on particular facts that support a desired 
rationale and to minimize the impact of facts that contradict it, this approach 
drew criticisms based on indeterminacy.  The main weakness of these non-
deferential approaches was that, since they afforded little to no deference to 
the deciding court in its determination of how broadly or narrowly to address 
the facts of the case, they were therefore better potential constraints on the 
deciding court than on later courts.  A workable approach to holding and 
 
 63 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1056 (explaining Wambaugh’s approach, and terming it 
the “necessary” approach). 
 64 Id. at 1056–57 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).  
A holding-dicta traditionalist would likely concede this point and say that the privilege of making 
law judicially requires a court to choose among possible alternative justifications, but, given the 
strong norm of avoidance of reversal among lower courts, this prescription would seem unrealistic.   
 65 Id. at 1058.   
 66 Id. at 1045.  
 67 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2020 (1994) (critiquing this 
approach as overly constrained and unreflective of actual judicial practices).   
 68 See id. (critiquing this approach as overly constrained and unreflective of actual judicial practices). 
But see Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 958 n. 11 (citing Professor Dorf’s recent article 
critiquing this particular theory as the only “major law review article in the past fifty years 
exclusively focused on offering a broad theoretical treatment of the distinction between holding and 
dicta”); id. at 1050 (citing Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–33 
(1989)) (likening the reconciliation approach to Dworkin’s “fit and justification” model of 
constitutional interpretation)). 
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dicta should constrain both.   
Another school of thought has afforded more deference to the deciding 
court in determining—through the reasoning of its opinion—just which of 
the case’s facts were material to the decision and which were incidental to it 
or distinguishable from it.  The oldest approach within this school, associated 
with Professor Goodhart, viewed the binding, precedential legal holding as 
the material facts of the case, as chosen by the deciding judge, that were 
associated with the outcome of the case.69  Thus, rather than deriving a 
binding rule through a post hoc justification for the decision in light of all of 
the facts of the case, Goodhart’s conception of a holding looked to the court’s 
articulation of its rationale, read in light of the court’s articulation of the 
material facts, to derive a binding, precedential rule.   
However, recognizing that opinions may appear differently in different 
case reporters, and that some opinions go unreported, Goodhart set up a test 
for materiality in the form of a rebuttable presumption either for or against 
materiality:  
  If the opinion does not distinguish between material and immaterial facts 
then all the facts set forth in the opinion must be considered material with 
the exception of those that on their face are immaterial.  There is a 
presumption against wide principles of law, and the smaller the number of 
material facts in a case the wider will the principle be.  Thus if a case like 
Hambrook v. Stokes, in which a mother died owing to shock at seeing a motor 
accident which threatened her child, is decided on the fact that a bystander 
may recover for injury due to shock, we have a broad principle of law.  If the 
additional fact that the bystander was a mother is held to be material we 
then get a narrow principle of law.  Therefore, unless a fact is expressly or 
impliedly held to be immaterial, it must be considered material.70 
Using this presumption, Goodhart argued, would allow for a later court to 
determine the materiality of the case facts, even where the deciding judge 
had failed to do so explicitly.  But Goodhart’s approach would always defer 
to the deciding judge’s determination of materiality if offered, and the test 
above was designed to direct later courts to view the prior case’s rule in as 
 
 69 Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 169 (1930).  Although 
Professor Goodhart used only the term “ratio decidendi” in his title, his discussion throughout the 
article was focused in what we today would term the holding, due to later incorporation of the terms 
into one concept).  See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1048 (discussing the early distinction 
between holding—the precise decision in the case—and ratio decidendi—“the generally applicable 
rule of law upon which the opinion says the holding rested,” and pointing out that the distinction 
has blurred (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW 
SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz, ed., Michael Ansaldi, trans., 1989))).   
 70 Goodhart, supra note 69, at 178 (footnotes omitted). For criticism of Goodhart’s theory, compare 
A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 453 (1957) (critiquing Goodhart’s 
approach as circular), and Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597, 
605 (1959) (critiquing Goodhart’s approach as inherently indeterminate), with A.L. Goodhart, The 
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117, 117 (1959) (responding to these critiques).   
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narrow terms as possible in the event of no designation of materiality in the 
opinion.71  Thus, although broader than the more traditionalist, non-
deferential approaches, Goodhart’s approach would nevertheless tend 
toward a narrow view of the propositions of a prior case that could be 
considered binding.   
Two other approaches within this more deferential school—both offered 
in much more recent times—seek to resolve both the alternative holdings 
problem created by the traditionalist approaches and the obvious competing 
problem of the blurring of lines between deciding cases and prospectively 
legislating, a likely risk where later courts afford the deciding judge total 
discretion in determining which facts before him were material to the 
outcome.  The first, from Professor Dorf, argues that the determination of 
which propositions should be counted as part of the holding of a decided case 
should proceed along lines similar to those followed in analyzing issue 
preclusion.72  Key to this approach is the later court’s determination that the 
prior court carefully considered the proposition in question, and that it was 
treated by that court as essential to the disposition, not in the logical, but-for 
sense, but in the sense of “the process by which the court decide[d] the case.”73   
Along similar lines, Professors Abramowicz & Stearns developed another 
test in the deferential school, attempting to capture the strengths of these 
early approaches, while accounting for their weaknesses, and to give a more 
defined and more easily applicable form and shape to sophisticated 
deferential approaches such as Professor Dorf’s.74  Although the authors do 
not give it a name, for purposes of quick reference here, I will refer to it as 
the “decisional path” approach.  Under the decisional path approach, 
propositions count as part of the holding if they lie along the “decisional 
path” of reasoning chosen by the court, and they “(1) are actually decided, 
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.”75   
The first prong of the decisional path approach requires that a 
proposition must have been actually decided in the case to be part of the 
holding.  This requirement ensures that mere errant statements in the 
majority opinion are not mistaken for holdings.76  The second prong requires 
that, even if a proposition is actually decided, its resolution must also be based 
on the actual facts of the case.  This requirement recognizes that legislative-
type holdings77 making broad pronouncements and resolving issues of law 
 
 71 Goodhart, supra note 69, at 178.   
 72 Dorf, supra note 67, at 1999.  
 73 Id. at 2045.   
 74 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 961–62, 1065.    
 75 Id. at 1065.   
 76 Id. at 1066. 
 77 See Solum, supra note 6, 186–89 (developing the idea of legislative holdings).   
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not presented squarely in the case’s facts not be counted as part of the 
holding.78   
The third prong requires that any actually decided proposition based on 
the facts of the case actually lead to the court’s ultimate decision resolving 
the issues of the case before it, if the proposition is to be considered part of 
the holding.79  This prong ensures that discussions of hypothetical 
alternatives to the court’s judgment, as well as refutations of challenges 
presented by dissenters based on assumptions of what the next case may 
provide (discussions that Professor Dorf refers to as “asides”80), are not 
misconstrued as the holding of the case.81   
Underlying all of these prongs is the requirement that any proposition 
must lie along the court’s “decisional path.”  This overarching requirement 
actually functions as a moderating force, rather than as a strict limitation, as 
the other prongs do.  The decisional path may include propositions that, 
while not “necessary” to the court’s ultimate resolution of the case, 
nevertheless led to it.  Thus, the decisional path approach attempts to capture 
the “carefully considered” propositions that are the target of Professor Dorf’s 
preclusion-based approach, but with a more defined set of factors aimed at 
easier and more consistent application.   
We need not declare an ultimate winner in these ongoing debates for the 
purposes of this Article.  It suffices to recognize that each approach seeks to 
hem in the holding of the case to that which addresses the material facts 
before the court.  Where they differ is in their tolerance for the deciding 
court’s discretion in treating some facts as material or non-material in 
arriving at its decision.  The broadest, and most recent, approaches 
presumptively grant near total deference to the deciding court, with the 
limitation on that discretion being the court’s depth of consideration of the 
propositions related to the facts the court treats as material.         
We now move from defining the parameters of the analysis this Article 
offers to its test case, Garcetti v. Ceballos.  The following Part reviews Garcetti’s 
origins and its content with an eye toward isolating its holding from its dicta.  
Going forward, we can afford the neoformalist approach its most favored 
posture by analyzing the performance of the Garcetti rule under what is 
arguably the broadest and most deferential modern approach to holding and 
dicta—the decisional path approach—understanding that the Garcetti rule 
would be more difficult to defend on the neoformalist grounds of 
predictability, uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion in the lower 
courts under any of the stricter approaches.   
 
 78 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1068. 
 79 Id. at 1066. 
 80 Dorf, supra note 67, at 2006.   
 81 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1065. 
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II.  FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
A.  The Basic Doctrine 
Under the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” the government may 
not condition the provision of a public benefit—including public 
employment—on the recipient’s relinquishment of a constitutional right.82  
Nevertheless, courts have permitted the government, acting in its role as an 
employer,83 to limit public employees’ speech rights that would otherwise be 
protected in a non-employment setting.84  In most cases, these limitations 
have focused on managerial interests.85  Until recently, such limitations have 
largely emerged through case-by-case balancing pitting employee speech 
interests (and the listening/reading interests of the public) against employer 
managerial interests, rather than through categorical rules excluding certain 
speech from protection in all cases.86   
 
 82 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967) (holding that a public university 
cannot condition employment as a professor on the professor’s signing of a “Loyalty Oath”); 
Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–16 (1989) (outlining 
the state of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine).  But see Bauries & Schach supra note 20, at 
359 (arguing that courts have too broadly applied the Garcetti rule, further curtailing public 
employee speech rights); Secunda, supra note 21, at 908–10 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s line 
of decisions in Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti have weakened the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
to the point of near obliteration). 
 83 It is also well-settled that the government does not always act in its traditional sovereign capacity, 
and when it acts in some other role, such as the role of an employer, an arts patron, or a property 
manager, the government can restrict speech in ways that serve the important governmental 
interests incidental to these roles.  See Scott R. Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern 
of the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 677, 742 (2014) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never 
recognized an individual’s absolute First Amendment right to academic freedom when balanced 
against government interests).   
 84 See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(“[S]peech relating to tasks within an employee’s uncontested employment responsibilities is not 
protected from regulation.”); Williams v. Dall. Ind. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(dismissing high school football coach’s First Amendment claims regarding a memorandum he had 
written concerning potential financial malfeasance on the part of school administrators, as the 
memorandum was written in the course of his job performance); Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. 
Co., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming that a school district can decline to renew a 
teacher’s contract for advocating her viewpoint on antiwar demonstrations in a classroom setting). 
 85 See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We agree with 
Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the teacher, has the right to fix the 
curriculum.”); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 39 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti is the latest in a series of Supreme Court 
decisions elevating “managerial prerogative” to constitutional status).   
 86 One might categorize an element of the Pickering analysis—the requirement that a public employee’s 
speech be made on a “matter of public concern”—as a categorical rule, but the bulk of the analysis 
involves a balance between the speech interests of the employee and the managerial interests of the 
employer.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (expressing skepticism about the public 
concerns expressed by an assistant district attorney who was fired after distributing a questionnaire 
regarding office morale, but ultimately resolving the case based on the managerial interests of the 
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Pickering v. Board of Education,87 the leading case on public employee speech 
rights, illustrates the standards-based approach.  In Pickering, a local teacher 
sent a letter to a newspaper criticizing the Board of Education’s prior 
handling of previous proposals to increase the Board’s revenues, urging the 
rejection of a pending bond issue.88  The Board terminated Mr. Pickering, 
stating that his letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools of the district.”89  On certiorari, the Court held 
the termination unconstitutional, explaining that, absent substantial 
justification, “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public 
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public 
employment.”90  To operationalize the “substantial justification” inquiry, the 
Court balanced the interests of the Board as an employer and the interests of 
Mr. Pickering as a participant in public debate, along with the interests of 
the public—the consumers of the speech.  The Court ultimately concluded 
that the Board could state no interest sufficient to overcome the interest of 
Mr. Pickering in participating as an ordinary citizen in an important public 
debate, and the interests of the public in learning the thoughts of a teacher 
within the system on an issue important to public education.91   
Following Pickering, the Court entertained few public employee First 
Amendment retaliation claims relevant to this discussion.92  However, one 
significant case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,93 further 
clarified that neither the situs nor the target of the speech in question is 
dispositive when determining whether the speech is protected.  In Givhan, the 
Court held that an employee’s internal complaints to her principal about 
possible race discrimination in personnel decisions at her school site 
constituted protected speech, and that the school’s managerial interests could 
not override the plaintiff’s interests in weighing in on an important topic.94   
 
 
employer).   
 87 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  For a thoughtful summary of the pre-Garcetti jurisprudence, beginning with 
Pickering, see generally Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2008).   
 88 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 572–74. 
 91 Id. at 574–75. 
 92 One major precedent, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), held that while the plaintiff’s 
speech did not have much public concern character to it, the employer’s interest in managing the 
workplace outweighed whatever public and speaker interests did exist.  Two other major 
precedents, City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (following Connick) and Mt. Healthy City 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (following Pickering), illustrated ways in which 
the government could prevail in the balance, but they both continued the Pickering approach to 
balancing.   
 93 439 U.S. 410 (1979).   
 94 Id. at 415–16.   
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Thus, under the pre-Garcetti precedent, the fact that speech on a matter 
of public concern is made while an employee is at work, to a superior, or 
otherwise through internal channels, does not render the speech 
unprotected.  Garcetti reaffirmed and adopted this framework as the 
foundation for its own ruling.   
B.  Garcetti v. Ceballos and Its Categorical Rule of Exclusion 
1.  The Garcetti Rule 
Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s Office, at the request of defense counsel, reviewed for 
accuracy an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a pending case.95  
Ceballos concluded that there were unsatisfactory inaccuracies in the 
affidavit, and concluded that the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant 
should be suppressed.  He relayed his findings to his superiors in the form of 
a “disposition memorandum”—essentially, a legal memorandum outlining 
the facts and his legal conclusions.96  His superiors decided to proceed with 
the prosecution.  Called to the stand in a motion to suppress hearing, 
Ceballos testified for the defense concerning the affidavit, but the trial court 
ultimately denied the motion.97  According to Ceballos, afterwards, he was 
subjected to a variety of retaliatory employment actions, including 
reassignment from his position and the denial of a promotion.98   
Ceballos sued, asserting a violation of his First Amendment rights.99  On 
appeal from summary judgment, the court of appeals applied the 
Pickering/Connick test and found Ceballos’s memo—by then the only speech 
at issue—to be “inherently a matter of public concern” because it “recited 
what [Ceballos] thought to be governmental misconduct.”100  The Ninth 
Circuit then proceeded to the interest-balancing portion of the 
Pickering/Connick test and found that Ceballos’s interest in his speech 
outweighed the government’s interests, noting that the government “‘failed 
even to suggest disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District 
Attorney’s Office’ as a result of the memo.”101  In other words, the Ninth 
Circuit analyzed the case as it would have analyzed any other—by balancing 
the relevant interests.   
 
 
 95 Id. at 413–14. 
 96 Id. at 414. 
 97 Id. at 414–15. 
 98 Id. at 415. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 416 (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 101 Id. (quoting Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180). 
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When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, drawing from the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Court explained that protecting 
public employees’ rights to speak out on matters of public concern “limits the 
ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to 
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their 
capacities as private citizens.”102  The Court reaffirmed that the public’s 
interest in receiving information about the functioning of government from 
those most qualified to provide it is substantial.103  Nevertheless, the Court 
also noted that public employers have a countervailing interest in policing 
speech that, due to the employee’s role, may contain confidential 
information, may be premature or factually incorrect, or may be damaging 
to the employer’s standing in the community.104   
Ordinarily, these claims would set the stage for a balancing of interests 
that would ultimately leave the speech either protected or unprotected, but 
in Garcetti, the Court took another path and instead adopted a new 
categorical rule:105 “We hold that, when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”106  The Court reasoned that, 
since Ceballos “wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, 
as a calendar deputy, was employed to do,” he was not speaking as a 
citizen.107  In essence, the speech in question—Ceballos’s disposition memo, 
was Ceballos’s work product as a government employee, not his own speech, 
and was therefore unprotected.   
2.  Garcetti’s Holding 
Despite the diversity among the approaches to holding and dicta 
reviewed above,108 each modern approach focuses in one way or another on 
 
 102 Id. at 419. 
 103 Id. at 419–20. 
 104 Id. at 422–23; see also Robert C. Cloud, Public Employee Speech on Matters Pursuant to Their Official Duties: 
Whistle While You Work?, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 855, 857–58 (2006) (discussing the rights and authority 
employers have to limit speech in certain circumstances).   
 105 Professor Sheldon Nahmod has referred to this ex ante version of balancing of interests, done in 
pursuit of the development of a generally applicable categorical rule, as “categorical balancing.”   
Nahmod, supra note 22, at 569–70 (“What the Court does when it balances categorically is weigh 
what it considers to be the relevant interests, social and individual, at a fairly high level of generality, 
and then by balancing those interests, arrive at a generally applicable rule to be applied in later 
cases without further balancing.” (footnote omitted) (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional 
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 977, 979, 981 (1987)).   
 106 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 107 Id.  
 108 This body of scholarship on the holding-dicta distinction continues to grow.  See, e.g., Shawn J. 
Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 126–27 (2009) (arguing for broader 
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two elements: (1) the facts of the prior case decided, and (2) the court’s 
pronouncements of its decision, along with the court’s selection of which facts 
to emphasize in making its way to the holding.109  Under the decisional path 
approach—arguably the most deferential approaches to the deciding court, 
and thus, one more likely than the others to yield a more capacious holding—
the court lays out a “decisional path” consisting of factual and legal 
propositions that ultimately make up the ratio decidendi of the case, and as 
long as those propositions are actually considered and decided, they are part 
of the holding.110 
In Garcetti, the facts the Court considered included stipulations that (1) the 
memorandum that Mr. Ceballos drafted recommending dismissal of the case 
was the only speech at issue, and (2) Mr. Ceballos drafted the memorandum 
pursuant to an official duty to draft legal memoranda.111  Following a 
recitation of these facts, the Court reviewed both Pickering and Givhan to 
support the propositions that it was immaterial that Mr. Ceballos spoke at 
work to his superiors (as Givhan did), and that it was immaterial that Ceballos 
spoke about matters related to his job (as both Pickering and Givhan did).112  
Following this review, the Court distinguished Ceballos from these two 
plaintiffs on the basis that neither Pickering nor Givhan were hired to make 
the speech that led to their discipline.113  Then, the Court clearly stated its 
ultimate rule: “We hold that, when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”114   
According to the Court, “The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that 
his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”115  
The Court cited this factor—that the memorandum was drafted as a 
 
categories of interpretation of case law than more formalistic distinctions like holding and dicta); 
Leval, supra note 24, at 1269 (arguing that lower courts afford dicta more weight than the Court 
realizes); Stinson, supra note 59, at 220 (arguing that closer attention must be paid to the holding-
dicta distinction in interpreting judicial opinions).  All these articles were published after 
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59.   
 109 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.   
 110 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1065 (discussing the effects of the decisional path 
approach). 
 111 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as 
a calendar deputy, was employed to do.”).   
 112 Id. at 420–21 (citing Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); Pickering v. 
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1967)). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 421.  Professor Solum has rightly admonished readers of legal opinions to be wary of judicial 
statements that begin with “We hold that . . .,” as they are usually indicative of judicial overreach 
into legislative territory, Solum, supra note 6, at 188, but in this case, the Court’s statement was in 
fact its resolution of the sole issue in the case as presented.   
 115 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.   
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requirement of Ceballos’s job—as the factor “distinguish[ing] Ceballos’ case 
from those in which the First Amendment provides protection against 
discipline.”116  Thus, a simple and faithful reading of the case would see the 
binding rule emerging from it as creating a categorical exemption from First 
Amendment protection for speech made “pursuant to official duties”;117 in 
other words, for speech that is an employee’s work product.118  Through the 
establishment of a categorical rule of decision where a more flexible standard 
both preexisted and would likely (but not certainly) have led to the same 
result in the case before the Court, the Court ostensibly made the 
adjudication of public employee speech matters less subject to the discretion 
of lower court judges and juries.   
As the scholarship on precedent teaches, Justice Kennedy’s repeated use 
of the phrase “pursuant to official duties” and its variants must be read in 
light of the facts before the Court.119  As outlined above, the two most 
relevant facts in the Garcetti case, according to the Court, were that (1) Mr. 
Ceballos’s memorandum was the only speech at issue; and (2) Mr. Ceballos 
drafted the memorandum as a requirement of his job.  When the Court 
stated, “We hold that, when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline,”120 the Court did so in the 
context of these stipulated facts.  The Court made this clear by preceding the 
statement of its holding with the limiting justification, “The controlling factor 
in Ceballos’ case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a 
calendar deputy.”121  Finally, citing both Pickering and Givhan as authority, the 
Court also made it clear that its stated holding was not to be construed to bar 
First Amendment protection for statements merely related to work, or for 
statements made while at work, or for statements made only to coworkers or 
 
 116 Id.   
 117 It is true that the mere utterance of “We hold that” before a statement is insufficient to convert it 
from dicta to holding.  Leval, supra note 24, at 1257–58.  Nevertheless, reading the binding rule in 
Garcetti as such is only bolstered by the fact that the Court preceded its “pursuant to official duties” 
statement with “We hold that . . .”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  
 118 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (using the term “work product” to describe Ceballos’s memorandum).   
 119 Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the dominant approaches to distinguishing 
between holding and dicta, each of which requires that a proposition be linked to the facts before 
the court at the time it rendered its decision in order to be considered part of the binding holding 
of the case.  See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1045–65 (reviewing the dominant 
approaches); Bayern, supra note 108, at 167–73 (2009) (proposing a new approach based on judicial 
intent, but limiting any expressions of intent to those within the facts of the case).   
 120 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 121 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (“Ceballos drafted his memorandum because that is what he was 
employed to do.”).   
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superiors.122  Thus, any reading of the case to bar protection for speech 
“related to” or “in the course of” employment would be directly foreclosed 
by the Court’s statements of what it was not holding, both of which 
immediately preceded the “We hold that . . .” statement.123   
With the above discussion in mind, the Court’s use of the phrase, “speaks 
pursuant to his official duties” to delineate the category of unprotected 
speech it recognized amounted to a public employee’s written or verbal work 
product—nothing more.  The Court took great pains to distinguish Mr. 
Ceballos from Mr. Pickering, who spoke about his workplace, relating matters of 
which his employment gave him unique knowledge, and who identified himself as a teacher 
in doing so, and Ms. Givhan, who spoke about her workplace, while at work, 
relating matters about which she learned by virtue of her employment, and who spoke 
only internally to her supervisors.124  The simple fact distinguishing Mr. Ceballos 
from these other two defendants is that neither Mr. Pickering’s nor Ms. 
Givhan’s speech amounted to their work product.125   
This interpretation makes considerable sense.  Public employees should 
not be able to claim that the work product they produce for their public 
employers constitutes their own personal speech.  Were this so, then as Justice 
Kennedy pointed out, we would be faced with the familiar problem of 
“constitutionalizing the employee grievance.”126  Barring First Amendment 
protection for a public employee’s work product accordingly fits within the 
general landscape of policies underlying the protection of most public 
employee speech.127  And because work product is an easily defined category 
of expression for most employees, it also makes sense to set that speech aside 
categorically as unprotected, rather than to do so case-by-case.   
 
 122 Id. at 419, 421 (citing and reaffirming Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 414 
(1979) (standing for the proposition that speech made while at work, even if made only internally 
to supervisors or coworkers, remains subject to First Amendment protection) and Pickering v. Bd. 
of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1967) (standing for the proposition that speech made relating to work, 
remains subject to First Amendment protection)).   
 123 See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16 (upholding First Amendment protection for a public school employee 
who complained of race discrimination in school personnel decisions while at work, and stated her 
complaints only internally to her supervisors). 
 124 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415–16.  
 125 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as 
a calendar deputy, was employed to do.”).  Another way of saying this is that drafting the 
memorandum is what he contracted with his employer to do.  See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN 
LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 35–36 (2008) (discussing the employment relationship as a 
contractual relationship with duties on each side of the bargain).   
 126 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 155 (declining to protect the 
plaintiff’s speech in part because it mostly stated a private employee grievance).   
 127 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 631, 645–48 (2012) (discussing the lines drawn by different courts on whether a public 
employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment).    
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3.  Garcetti’s Errata and the Phenomenon of Over-Justification 
Illustrating a more recent phenomenon in Supreme Court judicial craft, 
Justice Kennedy thoroughly justified his majority’s decision, making 
numerous arguments against both the dissenters and the respondents in an 
effort to support and insulate the Garcetti holding and its categorical rule.  For 
example, in addressing the respondent’s brief, Justice Kennedy rejected 
“Ceballos’s proposed contrary rule” (i.e., the application of the Pickering test), 
on the basis that it would mandate ongoing and intrusive “judicial oversight 
of communications between and among government employees and their 
superiors in the course of official business.”128  Several courts have picked up 
on the use of the employment law term of art “in the course of”129 and 
concluded that any communication uttered while working is exempt from 
First Amendment protection.130  Justice Kennedy repeated this dictum in 
another form while defending the scope of the Court’s actual holding against 
the contrary view of the Ninth Circuit majority.131   
One factor motivating the court of appeals to apply the Pickering test was 
a “perceived anomaly” in First Amendment jurisprudence that would 
otherwise have resulted—that an employee’s statement on a matter of public 
concern at work would be unprotected, but the same employee’s identical 
public statement outside of work would arguably qualify for protection.132  In 
answering this concern, Justice Kennedy stated that the Pickering test still 
applies to employees speaking “outside the course of performing their official 
duties.”133  By negative implication, this choice of phrasing once again called 
up the familiar, and much broader, term of art associated with workers’ 
compensation, rather than the Court’s much narrower, “pursuant to” 
holding.134   
Finally (as to the majority’s dicta), and most troublingly, in emphasizing 
the rule that public employees may not claim First Amendment protection 
to speech that amounts to their own job duties, the Court stated:  “Restricting 
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
 
 128 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
 129 This term calls up, for example, the definition of a compensable injury found in many state workers’ 
compensation statutes.  E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1) (2011) (“An employee, who receives 
a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to 
this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act.”).   
 130 E.g. Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 131 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing 
their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind 
of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.” (emphasis added)).   
 132 See id. at 423–24 (addressing the “perceived . . . anomaly”).   
 133 Id. at 423.  
 134 See also id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action 
behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”). 
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does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”135  Characterizing what the 
Court, in the immediately preceding paragraph, had carefully described and 
cabined as the job-required speech of the employee as instead any speech 
that “owes its existence” to the employee’s employment sounds like a “but-
for” test.  If any speech that “owes its existence” to a government employee’s 
employment is speech “pursuant to” that employee’s “official duties,” then 
any speech that the employee makes at work, that relates to the employee’s 
job in any way, that the employee repeats from what he heard at work, or 
that the employee makes based on information he learned at work, all 
qualifies as speech made “pursuant to official duties.”  This formulation 
would have abrogated Pickering.  
Illustrating the problems inherent in over-justification, the dissenters 
largely focused on these statements, often to the exclusion of the holding, to 
make their points.  Justice Stevens, for example, authored a brief dissent.  In it, 
he criticized the “categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and 
speaking in the course of one’s employment” as “quite wrong.”136  As authority 
for his argument, Justice Stevens cited Givhan, which the majority took pains to 
reaffirm in its own opinion.  Importantly, both the majority and the Stevens 
dissent cited Givhan for the identical proposition that an employee does not lose 
First Amendment protection merely by speaking at work, even internally, and 
even on a matter related to work, such as race discrimination in the employer’s 
practices.137  This cross-citation of the same case for the same proposition 
indicates that the majority and Justice Stevens were talking past one another, 
but Justice Stevens’s failure to recognize that the majority’s decision made no 
change to Givhan (indeed explicitly reaffirming it), coupled with his use of the 
“course of employment” language found in Justice Kennedy’s dicta, provided 
fodder for later courts’ confused applications of the rule.   
Justice Souter’s lengthy dissent, joined in full by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, gave significant attention to the holding, contending that the 
majority’s categorical rule leaves much room for judicial mischief through its 
failure to articulate a test for whether speech is “pursuant to” one’s 
employment duties.138    
Justice Souter proposed his own preferred rule for the case, that an 
employer’s “substantial interests in effectuating its chosen policy and 
objectives” can be outweighed by “private and public interests in addressing 
 
 135 Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added). 
 136 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 137 Id. at 420–21 (majority opinion); id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 138 Id. at 428–44 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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official wrongdoing and threats to health and safety,” and when they are, 
“public employees who speak on these matters in the course of their duties should 
be eligible to claim First Amendment protection.”139  Justice Souter’s 
preferred rule, if adopted, would actually shrink some of the Pickering 
protection left undisturbed by the majority’s holding.  If read literally, it 
would place a public employee’s expression made “in the course of duties” 
outside the protection of the First Amendment unless it addresses “a matter 
of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility.”140     
Based on Justice Souter’s articulation of an alternative rule, then, one 
must conclude that either (1) Justice Souter misapprehended the scope of the 
majority’s categorical rule, which limited its exemption to expression made 
“pursuant to” one’s job duties; or (2) Justice Souter (and those joining his 
dissent) would prefer a much broader First Amendment exemption for 
expression made “in the course of duties,” with a limited exception for speech 
addressing matters of “unusual” public importance.141  Thus, both the 
majority and Justice Souter’s dissent favored categorical exemptions from 
First Amendment protection for public employee speech, but possibly due to 
their inordinate focus on dicta to the exclusion of holding, or possibly due to 
an increased concern for what Professor Rosenthal has termed “managerial 
prerogative” 142 in all but the most important cases, the dissenters would 
propose a much broader exemption.143   
Justice Breyer declined to join Justice Souter’s dissent along with the 
other three dissenters, writing for himself.144  From his first statement of the 
issue before the Court, Justice Breyer perpetuated the elevation of the “in the 
course” dictum first uttered in the majority opinion, framing the issue as the 
protection owed to speech that “takes place in the ordinary course of 
performing the duties of a government job.”145  Interestingly, though, Justice 
Breyer also proposed a categorical rule, and one that read as even broader 
than the one proposed by the other dissenters, which itself was broader than 
the majority’s rule.   
 
 139 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).  
 140 Id. at 435.  
 141 See also id. at 437 (“[The majority’s cited case] is no authority for the notion that government may 
exercise plenary control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his job.”).   
 142 See generally Rosenthal, supra note 85 (referring to managerial prerogatives that ensure political 
officials are held politically accountable for the operations of their public offices).   
 143 The dissenters largely are the subject of sympathetic commentary in the scholarly studies of Garcetti.  
No such commentary, to my knowledge, has acknowledged either (1) that the dissenters themselves 
propose a categorical rule, or (2) that the rule they propose seems to sweep far expression within its 
scope (at least in cases where the narrow exception does not apply) than the rule adopted by the 
majority.   
 144 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 444–50 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (writing separately to explain his difference 
in opinion from both the majority opinion and Justice Souter’s dissent).  
 145 Id. at 444.  
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Under Justice Breyer’s rule, which incorporated the “in the course” 
language, public employee speech that occurs “in the course of ordinary job-
related duties” qualifies for First Amendment protection if it addresses a 
matter of public concern, but “only in the presence of an augmented need 
for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial 
interference with governmental management of the public’s affairs.”146  Like 
the rule proposed by the other three dissenters, Justice Breyer’s proposed rule 
did not contain any requirement that the speech in question be mandated by 
the job in question—only that the speech in question “takes place” while a 
public employee is performing his or her “ordinary job duties.”147  Under 
this formulation, as under the formulation proposed by the other dissenters, 
an employee may have a job that does not require any speech at all, yet may 
still be denied the protection of the First Amendment if the employee simply 
speaks while working, and neither the Constitution nor state-created 
professional obligations places any special duty to speak in the public interest 
on that employee.148   
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION RULES AND JUDICIAL CRAFT   
A.  The Elevation of Errata in the Lower Courts 
Like neoformalist constitutional construction itself, Garcetti’s rule is 
grounded in a preference for predictability and uniformity in the law and the 
cabining of judicial discretion.149  It is therefore founded on the empirical 
 
 146 Id. at 449–50 (affording constitutional protection for speech that occurs during the course of a 
governmental employee’s job and involves a matter of public concern). 
 147 Id. (failing to mention a requirement for mandated employee speech).   
 148 See id. at 445 (listing what Justice Breyer believes is common ground).  Although neither Justice 
Souter nor Justice Breyer claims that his rule is categorical, their use of absolutist terms such as 
“unless,” id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting), and “only,” id. at 445 (Breyer, J., dissenting), compels 
this conclusion.  Perhaps if either were in the majority, he would have proposed a less restrictive 
rule, but the willingness of each to base a substantial portion of his opinion, as well as his proposed 
alternative rule, on the “in the course” dictum of the majority opinion, rather than on the narrower 
“pursuant to” exemption, suggests otherwise.   
 149 See id. at 423 (majority opinion) (“Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court of 
Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating 
judicial oversight of communications between and among government employees and their 
superiors in the course of official business.  This displacement of managerial discretion by judicial 
supervision finds no support in our precedents.  When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing 
a matter of public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing 
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.  When, however, the employee is simply 
performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny.  To hold 
otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental 
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of 
powers.”); Rhodes, supra note 21, at 1194 (stating Garcetti’s rule superficially promotes 
predictability).   
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assumption that lower courts will faithfully apply categorical rules of decision 
once these decision rules are established.150  In effect, all categorical rules 
assume the adherence of the lower courts to a strict version of stare decisis.  
Without this assumption, the theoretical justifications for preferring 
categorical rules over standards collapse.        
However, a survey of the lower court cases applying Garcetti reveals that 
this assumption was misplaced.  In case after case, the lower courts have read 
Garcetti to exclude far more speech from the First Amendment’s protection 
than the Court obviously meant to exclude.  The tool they have used to 
accomplish this expansion of the exclusionary holding is, in most cases, the 
dicta and other errata scattered throughout the majority and dissents in the 
case.  Below, I outline the general trends in the use of these phrases, leading 
to a discussion of the Court’s most recent consideration of the issue in Lane v. 
Franks,151 through which the Court supplied the lower courts with a useful, 
but far too circumspect, corrective.  The discussion below takes the two most 
quoted errata and shows how the lower courts have used them to reach 
results contrary to what neoformalist would expect (or hope) to see.   
1.  The “Course of Performing” Dictum   
Beginning with what I will term the “course of performing” dictum, the 
Court in Garcetti, after setting forth its categorical exclusion of speech made 
“pursuant to official duties” from the First Amendment’s protection, 
proceeded to defend that rule against counter-arguments offered by the 
dissents and the appellee, Ceballos.   
The Court introduced the “course of performing” dictum in framing the 
appellee’s argument: “Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the 
Court of Appeals, would commit state and federal courts to a new, 
permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial oversight of 
communications between and among government employees and their 
superiors in the course of official business.”152  The Court continued, framing the 
lower court’s error in applying the Pickering test in the following way:  
  The Court of Appeals based its holding in part on what it perceived as a 
doctrinal anomaly.  The court suggested it would be inconsistent to compel 
public employers to tolerate certain employee speech made publicly but not 
speech made pursuant to an employee’s assigned duties.  This objection 
misconceives the theoretical underpinnings of our decisions. Employees who 
make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain 
some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of 
 
 150 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 8, at 1176–77 (implying this assumption in distinguishing between 
judicially crafted rules and standards).   
 151 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).  
 152 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added).   
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activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.  The 
same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper, or discussing politics with 
a co-worker.  When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment 
responsibilities, however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens 
who are not government employees.153 
Reading the language quoted might lead one to conclude that the Court was 
expressing the grounds for a negative inference—by saying that employees 
speaking “outside the course of performing their official duties” may retain 
First Amendment protection, perhaps the Court was implying that any 
employee speaking while within the course of performing official duties 
cannot access such protection.   
But this interpretation would place the Garcetti rule directly at odds with 
Givhan, cited approvingly by the Garcetti Court, which approved First 
Amendment protection for speech made while the speaker was at work, and 
only to her supervisor, not to mention Rankin v. McPherson,154 which approved 
protection for employees talking politics while working.  Further, this 
interpretation would contradict the last sentence of the passage above, which 
clearly defines the speech excluded as that which is “pursuant to employment 
responsibilities,” and which has no relevant citizen-speech analogue.  Finally, 
it would contradict the carefully circumscribed holding of the case, as outlined 
above.  It would be odd to think that the Court would deliberately set forth a 
circumscribed holding, even using the words, “We hold that” to introduce it, 
and then set forth a directly contrary one only a few paragraphs later.   
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, adopted this 
interpretation.  He framed the basis for his dissent in the terms of the quote 
above, rather than in the terms of the Court’s holding, stating, “The notion 
that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking 
in the course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”155  Justice Souter’s dissent also 
adopted this framing, in stating its alternative preferred holding, “[A]n 
employee commenting on subjects in the course of duties should not prevail on 
balance unless he speaks on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high 
standards of responsibility in the way he does it.”156 
Also, Justice Breyer, in dissent, adopted this mistaken interpretation.  He 
framed the issues in the case as, “whether the First Amendment protects 
public employees when they engage in speech that both (1) involves matters 
of public concern and (2) takes place in the ordinary course of performing the duties 
 
 153 Id. at 423–24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Cabellos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 
1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004); then citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); and then 
citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)).   
 154 483 U.S. 378, 390–92 (1987). 
 155 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
 156 Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
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of a government job.”157  He reiterated this misconception in stating his 
preferred alternative holding:  
  I conclude that the First Amendment sometimes does authorize judicial 
actions based upon a government employee’s speech that both (1) involves a 
matter of public concern and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary job-related 
duties.  But it does so only in the presence of augmented need for 
constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue judicial interference 
with governmental management of the public’s affairs.158  
Thus, not only the dicta in the majority opinion, but also the errata in dissent, 
supplied ammunition for courts seeking to expand the boundaries of Garcetti’s 
exclusion.   
Considering the above, it is little wonder that the “course of performing” 
erratum has been a popular one with lower courts, and that its application 
almost always leads to the employee-plaintiff’s loss, where a “pursuant to 
official duties” rule would have left open the possibility of protection.  In 
Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,159 for example, the Fifth Circuit 
denied First Amendment protection to a high school athletic director who 
was terminated allegedly in retaliation for writing a memorandum to the 
school administration questioning the use of athletic funds.160   
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the speech in question was not 
speech required of an athletic director, but framed its task in the case as one to 
“determine the extent to which, under Garcetti, a public employee is protected 
by the First Amendment if his speech is not necessarily required by his job 
duties but nevertheless is related to his job duties.”161  Citing the majority 
opinion, the Williams court stated the very broad proposition, neither held 
nor even stated in Garcetti, that “Activities undertaken in the course of 
performing one’s job are activities pursuant to official duties.”162  The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion ends with the statement, “We thus hold that Williams’s 
memoranda to the office manager and principal Wright were written in the 
course of performing his job as Athletic Director; thus, the speech contained 
therein is not protected by the First Amendment.”163     
Although the circuits have not interpreted the decision uniformly, and 
some circuits have faithfully read the holding as a narrow First Amendment 
exception keyed to a public employee’s work product,164 other federal 
 
 157 Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).   
 158 Id. at 449–50 (emphasis added).   
 159 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 160 Id. at 690–91.  The memorandum also included veiled charges of internal corruption, citing a 
“network of friends and house rules.”  Id. at 691.  
 161 Id. at 693. 
 162 Id. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).   
 163 Id. at 694.   
 164 See, e.g., Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that much of plaintiff’s speech 
made while working was protected because it was not required as part of her job duties but 
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appellate decisions have made mistakes similar to that of the Fifth Circuit.  
For example, in Weintraub v. Board of Education,165 the Second Circuit denied 
First Amendment protection to a teacher who had allegedly been retaliated 
against for filing a union grievance.  The court cited the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Williams and concluded that the teacher’s “speech challenging the 
school administration’s decision to not discipline a student in his class” was 
“‘undertaken in the course of performing,’ his primary employment 
responsibility of teaching.”166   
Similarly, in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy,167 the Tenth 
Circuit denied First Amendment protection to teachers at a public charter 
school, who had expressed concerns over “the Academy’s expectations 
regarding student behavior,”168 “the Academy’s curriculum and 
pedagogy,”169 and “money [spent] on instructional aids, furniture, and 
classroom computers.”170  The court evaluated each of these categories of 
speech and concluded that, because each related to the job requirements of 
the teachers and was uttered through a grievance at work, the speech was 
made “pursuant to” duties.171  To set these conclusions up, the court, like the 
Fifth Circuit in Williams, conflated the Garcetti “in the course” dictum with 
the “pursuant to” term in the Court’s holding, concluding that “if an 
employee engages in speech during the course of performing an official duty and 
the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates the employee’s 
performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties.”172  
2.  The “Owes Its Existence” Dictum   
The Court introduced the “owes its existence” dictum in seeking to justify 
the rule it had laid down only a few paragraphs before that public employees 
do not receive the protection of the First Amendment for speech they make 
pursuant to their official duties.  The justification sought to show that the 
speech excluded merely constituted the public employee’s work product, and 
therefore it was immaterial whether the employee himself also had some 
personal expressive interest in making it.  But Justice Kennedy chose to 
 
remanding for a determination of the extent of the jury’s reliance on paperwork completed in relation 
to harassment complaints, where the filling out of such paperwork was one of plaintiff’s job duties).   
 165 593 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 166 Id. at 203 (quoting Williams, 480 F.3d at 693).   
 167 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).   
 168 Id. at 1204 (providing an example of a matters discussed pursuant to the plaintiffs’ duties as 
teachers).   
 169 Id. (identifying subject matter that the plaintiff discussed).   
 170 Id.  (detailing the plaintiff’s complaint about the Academy). 
 171 Id. (concluding that expressing complaints about some tasks was done “pursuant to” duties). 
 172 Id. at 1203.   
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articulate this justification in terms that obfuscated the rule it sought to 
justify:  
The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to Ceballos’ 
official duties.  Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might 
have enjoyed as a private citizen.  It simply reflects the exercise of employer 
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.173 
Obviously, even a conservative reading of the phrase “speech that owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” has the 
potential to sweep within the Court’s exclusion speech that, for example, 
merely reveals an employee’s knowledge of his work or work environment, 
as Pickering’s speech did.  But the Court made clear multiple times that it 
was not taking speech such as Pickering’s out of the protection of the First 
Amendment.  A reading of the entire quoted section above reveals that the 
Court here was attempting to distinguish a public employee’s verbal and 
written work product from other speech the employee might make, whether 
at work or elsewhere.  But a reading of the emphasized phrase without this 
context allows for a much broader exclusion.   
The “owes its existence” dictum has found its way into several lower court 
opinions applying Garcetti, so much so that it has been the only erratum to 
date that has led to a corrective ruling by the Supreme Court, discussed 
below.  Two examples will illustrate its use.174  In Fox v. Traverse City Area Public 
Schools Board of Education,175 a teacher was disciplined for complaining to her 
supervisors that, as a special education pull-out teacher, she was required to 
supervise more students than the maximum allowed under applicable law.176  
No party to the case contended that Ms. Fox’s job duties required her to 
make such complaints, or to monitor the number of students she was 
 
 173 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (emphasis added).   
 174 To be sure, several circuit court majorities pushed back against this trend, and several other circuit 
court dissenters have pointed out how unwise it is to read the Supreme Court’s exclusion more 
broadly than the facts of the Garcetti case would permit.  Most notably, a majority in the Third 
Circuit recently, in no uncertain terms, rejected the efforts of a school district to elevate the “owes 
its existence” dictum to a holding, stating:  
These arguments ask us to read Garcetti far too broadly.  This Court has never applied 
the “owes its existence to” test that Appellants wish to advance, and for good reason:  this 
nearly all-inclusive standard would eviscerate citizen speech by public employees simply 
because they learned the information in the course of their employment, which is at odds 
with the delicate balancing and policy rationales underlying Garcetti.   
  Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 989 (3d Cir. 2014).  The existence of this decision 
and a small number of others is encouraging, but their existence does not detract for my central 
point, which is that, unless all, or at least most, lower court judges are as disciplined as this Third 
Circuit panel, a categorical rule promulgated by the Supreme Court is likely to be of little use in 
simplifying decisions, fostering predictability, and cabining judicial discretion, and may in fact do 
more harm than good. 
 175 605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2010).   
 176 Id. at 347.   
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required to supervise for compliance with the law.  Nevertheless, the Sixth 
Circuit held that, because “her complaint about class size ‘owe[d] its 
existence to’ her responsibilities as a special education teacher,” her speech 
was unprotected.177   
A recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates the mischief of this particular 
dictum in allowing courts to equate any public employee speech “ow[ing] its 
existence to” the employee’s official duties with “government speech,”178 
which is thought to be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.179  In Johnson 
v. Poway Unified School Dist., a teacher, dissatisfied with what he viewed as his 
colleagues’ promotion of various Eastern religious traditions on their 
classroom bulletin boards,180 decided to place symbols of Christianity on his 
own classroom’s bulletin board.  The school’s policy was to allow teachers to 
decorate their own bulletin boards at their discretion, subject to the ultimate 
control of the school principal.  The teacher sued for violation of his First 
Amendment speech and religious rights after being disciplined for hanging 
the Christian symbols.  Ultimately, the case was disposed of under the 
Religion Clauses, but as to Mr. Johnson’s speech claim, the court held simply 
that the speech on his classroom bulletin boards, because it “owed its 
existence to his official job duties,” was “government speech,” citing the 
“owes its existence” dictum.181     
 
 177 Id. at 349 (quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 544 (6th Cir. 2007)).   
 178 See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a teacher’s 
discretionary use of his classroom bulletin boards was the “government speech” of the district and 
not the personal speech of the teacher).  To be sure, other cases have mentioned the Garcetti 
majority’s citation to Rosenberger v. Rectors of the University of Virginia, and have represented it as the 
Court’s holding, but none of these cases justified the disposition on a government speech rationale.  
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a 
particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))); Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist., 707 F. Supp. 
2d 561, 576 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (mentioning the Garcetti majority’s citation to Rosenberger); Doucette v. 
Minocqua, Hazelhurst & Lake Tomahawk Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 07-cv-292-bbc, 2008 WL 
2412988, at *5 (W.D. Wis. June 12, 2008) (“Thus, the Court appears to be saying that when a 
public employee speaks pursuant to her job duties, she is in essence speaking on behalf of the 
government and the government should have complete authority over its own speech.”); see also 
W.V. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 299 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Garcetti, 427 U.S. at 421–23) (claiming Garcetti held “that speech made by [a] government 
employee pursuant to official duties is government speech” in a non-employment-related traditional 
government speech case).   
 179 See generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 587 (2008) (discussing how protection of free expression is contingent on the source of the 
expression).   
 180 The display most prominently featured in the court’s opinion was that of several Tibetan prayer 
flags.  See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 973 (distinguishing the Tibetan flags that were displayed without 
religious intent from intentionally Christian displays).   
 181 Id. at 970 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22).  The Garcetti majority’s government speech dictum, 
in which it referenced the principles of the government speech doctrine and cited Rosenberger, but 
did not hold that public employee speech is government speech, has not featured prominently in 
 
Dec. 2018] NEOFORMALIST CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 473 
B.  Lane v. Franks: A Useful, but Limited, Corrective 
The Roberts Court considered its second public employee speech case in 
October Term 2013.  Lane v. Franks presented the First Amendment claims 
of Edward Lane, an Alabama public community college employee who was 
hired to manage a community outreach and education program with several 
employees.  As one of his early tasks on the job, Lane audited the payroll and 
work records of all of his employees and discovered that, based on these 
records, Suzanne Schmitz, a then-sitting member of the Alabama 
Legislature, had been receiving a salary from the program but doing little to 
no work in exchange for it.182   
Lane held a meeting with Schmitz at which he demanded that she begin 
doing work that would justify the salary, but she refused, so he terminated 
her employment.183  Upon learning of her termination Schmitz threatened 
retaliation against Lane.184  Eventually, the Department of Justice learned of 
Schmitz’s no-show job, and because the program was funded in part 
federally, prosecuted her for fraud.185  Lane was called as a witness during 
the trial, and he testified truthfully as to the facts set forth above.  Following 
Lane’s testimony, the program’s entire twenty-nine-person workforce was 
laid off, with all but Lane and one other former employee being rehired.186   
Lane sued the college’s president, who ordered the layoffs and selective 
rehirings, asserting, among other claims, a claim that his First Amendment 
rights had been violated.  His argument was that his testimony in Schmitz’s 
trial was speech protected by the First Amendment, and that the college’s 
president had impermissibly retaliated against him for this protected 
speech.187  
The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court after the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment against Lane.188  The court of appeals based its decision 
substantially on Garcetti, along with some pre-Garcetti precedent that the court 
viewed as consistent with Garcetti.189  Under the court’s reading of Garcetti, 
which employed the “owed its existence” dictum of Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion as a holding, the court held that, since Lane had only 
 
the appellate cases applying Garcetti, but it stands as yet another example of errant language that 
appellate courts, such as the Johnson court, can use to limit rights beyond Garcetti’s narrow exclusion. 
 182 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2014). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 2376. 
 187 Id.  
 188 Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 Fed. App’x. 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).   
 189 Id. at 711–12 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006)). 
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learned about Schmitz’s no-show job by virtue of his employment as head of 
the program, his testimony “owed its existence to [Lane’s] professional 
responsibilities,” and was therefore unprotected under Garcetti.190   
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals.  Holding 
that the Garcetti decision removed from the protection of the First 
Amendment only from speech the employee was required to make as part of 
a job duty, the Court easily concluded that offering testimony in a criminal 
case did not meet this test for Lane.191  He was not employed to testify in 
criminal trials, nor did his job duties even suggest that his employer would 
ever ask him to do so.  Though Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito joined a 
separate concurrence to further clarify what the Court was not holding, all 
nine Justices concurred in the result and the Court’s reasoning in full.  In 
other words, with Garcetti on the books, Lane was an “easy” case—one that 
did not split the Justices on any important point.   
C.  The Lessons of Garcetti and Lane for “Law of Rules” Values 
Lane illustrates, above all, that the interpretation of the Court’s rule in 
Garcetti offered above is the correct one—only an employee’s work product is 
excluded from First Amendment protection, and that this reading of Garcetti 
is not a controversial or non-obvious one.192  Given the clarity of the Garcetti 
holding, and the care with which the Court’s majority distinguished Garcetti 
from Pickering and Givhan, then, what explains the Eleventh Circuit’s reading 
of the case?  If neoformalists such as Justice Scalia, who signed on to the 
majority’s categorical rule, are correct about the virtues of predictability, 
uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion when courts articulate 
 
 190 Id. at 711 (quoting Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)).   
 191 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.  
 192 That said, the Court’s justices still seem to be unable to hold Garcetti’s errant language and its 
holding separate when they discuss the case.  For a very recent example of this judicial carelessness, 
see Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
In describing the public employee speech analysis, Justice Kagan stated, “[T]he Court first asks 
whether the employee ‘spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’  If she did not—but rather 
spoke as an employee on a workplace matter—she has no ‘possibility of a First Amendment claim.’” 
Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).  This formulation would be broad enough to exclude the 
speech of Givhan and others like her, who speak on workplace matters that are also matters of 
public concern while working, where their speech is not made pursuant to their official duties, but 
is nevertheless uttered at work.  The direct quotes come out of the section of Garcetti Justice Kagan 
was citing, which discusses the difference between Pickering, which involved speech on a matter of 
public concern, and Connick, which did not.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  But she cites Garcetti, 
rather than these two primary cases, for the point, and the “but rather” language is Justice Kagan’s 
own formulation of the Garcetti exclusion.  Urging a broader reading of the Garcetti exclusion would 
have potentially changed the Janus result, but using that particular formulation could also provide 
an opportunity for more out-of-context quoting by lower courts, leading to greater expansion of the 
Garcetti exclusion.   
 
Dec. 2018] NEOFORMALIST CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 475 
rules rather than standards, then the Court of Appeals should have avoided 
its error easily, even notwithstanding prior existing circuit precedent that 
appeared to contradict Garcetti’s narrow exemption.   
The only plausible explanation is that the Court of Appeals read the 
“owes its existence” dictum in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, found it 
to be consistent with the language of this earlier case law within the Circuit 
(case law that, by distinguishing Pickering and Givhan, Garcetti had abrogated), 
and applied it as a holding of the case.  As illustrated above, a fair reading of 
Garcetti using even the broadest of the competing approaches to holding and 
dicta would never have included the “owes its existence” proposition within 
the Garcetti holding.193  Therefore, since the Garcetti rule is in the nature of the 
rules that neoformalists favor and defend on the grounds of predictability, 
uniformity, and the cabining of judicial discretion, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision, along with the other court of appeals decisions reviewed above 
applying other dicta from Garcetti as holdings, stands as stark evidence that 
employing a rule-based construction in Garcetti has failed thus far.  It also 
forms a significant data point in argument against the use of rules in general 
to foster the neoformalist values of predictability, certainty, and cabining of 
judicial discretion.    
The next Part considers a likely explanation for this disconnect between 
values and methods—the undue lawmaking deference that the lower courts 
afford all of the pronouncements in a Supreme Court opinion—and 
interrogates the common justifications for this practice.  Based on the 
argument above, and the explanation considered below, the lower courts 
should reconsider their duty to check the Court’s power from below.  They 
can do so most effectively by applying the holding-dicta distinction to 
Supreme Court decisions, especially decisions that limit preexisting rights 
through the development of categorical rules of exclusion.  But more 
importantly, the Court should be much more mindful of the ways in which 
it expresses and crafts its rule-establishing decisions.   
IV.  THE BREAKDOWN OF VERTICAL SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A.  Deference and Dicta 
From the discussion above, one might conclude that neoformalist 
constitutional construction is illegitimate or futile, as evidenced by the courts 
of appeals’ broad misapplications of Garcetti’s rule.  Of course, Garcetti is one 
data point—a test case, chosen for its suitability to the inquiry here, 
particularly the fact that it articulated a categorical rule of exclusion where a 
 
 193 See supra Section I.C (reviewing the approaches to holding and dicta); supra Section II.B.2 (discussing 
the holding of Garcetti).   
476 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:2 
balancing test once would have governed the same question.  But one case 
does not refute an entire theory.  In fact, categorical rules do have the 
potential to operate, in some cases, to usefully constrain politically or 
strategically influenced lower court decision making, and to foster more 
predictability and uniformity in the law.194   
But this potential is frustrated by the tendency of lower federal courts to 
treat the dicta in Supreme Court decisions as though it were binding, or at 
least to engage a presumption that, were the issue to come before the Court 
again, the dicta in the already decided case would dictate the result in that 
later case.195  In other words, the normative case for neoformalist 
construction is impaired because the descriptive neoformalist account—that 
lower courts generally apply clear rules—appears to be incorrect, at least in 
the case where such rules are surrounded by dicta and other errata.   
The literature contains several justifications for this lower court deference 
to Supreme Court dicta, each of which fails on further examination.  Prior 
scholarship has contended that, due to its location at the very top of this 
hierarchical structure of American courts, its role as a definer of both codified 
and federal common law judicial procedural rules (the latter of which include 
the rules of stare decisis), and its limited docket of important, national 
questions, the Supreme Court may have the ability to designate its own 
statements as either holding or dicta without regard to the facts and issues 
before the Court.196  When examined, though, each of these propositions is 
 
 194 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (providing an example of a case that 
promulgated a categorical rule that usefully constrains lower courts).  Smith, authored by Justice 
Scalia, articulated a categorical rule of exclusion from constitutional protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause.  That Clause’s protections do not extend to those who violate religiously neutral 
criminal laws of general applicability, regardless of the burdens imposed on religious exercise. Id. 
at 881–82.  In the years following, the lower courts have mostly faithfully followed this rule, and it 
has clarified and made predictable at least one limitation (that of the general criminal law) on the 
scope of religious protections.  The Court has also not had to revisit the rule itself due to 
misinterpretation, as it did Garcetti.  Its predictability and cabining of judicial discretion, rather, has 
led to legislative efforts to limit it, and litigation efforts to achieve the result it forbids through other 
constitutional strategies.  See, e.g., Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise after Employment 
Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2009, 210 (2011) (arguing that, due to the durability of Smith’s categorical exclusion, litigants have 
turned to creative speech and association arguments to support what would have been free exercise 
claims, pre-Smith).   
 195 See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 520 (2018) (stating the proposition that federal appellate courts 
are “bound” by the “considered dicta” of the Supreme Court, particularly where it is of “recent 
vintage” and not “enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, 
at 1084 n.422 (citing In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (making the point that 
federal judges should engage in such deference)); see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 1178–79 (making a 
similar point).   
 196 See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 59, at 1067 (discussing how, because the Supreme Court sits 
at the top of the judicial structure, it might require “greater latitude than other courts in determining 
the scope of its holdings” (citing Michael E. Solomine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the 
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based on a flawed conception of the role of the judiciary, and particularly the 
Supreme Court, in a government of distributed powers.   
First, the location of the Supreme Court at the top of the judicial 
hierarchy does not justify its assumption of powers not belonging to any of 
the lower echelons of that hierarchy.  Rather, it simply justifies the broad 
geographical reach of the Supreme Court’s actual holdings.  Where the First 
Circuit’s holdings bind only that circuit and the lower courts located within 
it, the holdings of the Supreme Court bind all lower federal and state courts.  
However, this familiar point does not compel the conclusion that the 
Supreme Court must therefore attempt in its decisions to resolve future 
questions of law unrelated to the cases it chooses for its docket, or that the 
Supreme Court is not required, as the other courts in the system are, to be a 
court.197  Instead, it justifies restraint as to these future cases, which have not 
yet been argued or briefed for the Court, and which may not have drawn 
vigorous advocacy from the parties, due to an inability to affect their own 
case’s outcome.198   
Where lower courts apply Supreme Court dicta as equivalent to the 
Court’s holdings, they cede power to the Court—the law development power 
that finds its best expression in case-by-case decision making in the lower 
courts.  In other words, where lower courts allow propositions reaching 
matters outside the facts of a Supreme Court case to be considered part of 
the holding, they allow the Court to take issues away from the lower courts 
that these lower courts should rightly decide first, resulting in a transfer of 
judicial power from the lower courts to the Supreme Court.199   
 
Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 358–59 (2002))).  See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article 
III’s Case/Controversy Distinctions and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 
(1994) (discussing the limited kinds of cases the Court can hear).  Of course, even this view 
presupposes that the Court will so designate a controversial statement in question.  It did so in 
Garcetti, but the later problems in applying the case ironically came from viewing non-designated 
statements as holdings.  See supra Part III (discussing the misapplication of the “owes its existence” 
dictum that led to Lane v. Franks).   
 197 Cf. Eric J. Segall, Is the Roberts Court Really a Court?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 701, 702 (2011) (criticizing 
the Roberts Court for ignoring the judicial duties of transparency, communication, and grappling 
in good faith with prior precedent).   
 198 See Leval, supra note 24, at 1261–62 (discussing how a party may not vigorously “assert its best 
defense” on issues that have no bearing on the outcome of their particular case).   
 199 Of course, this problem, so framed, is not one of constitutional significance, as the Constitution 
does not require a system of lower federal courts.  See U.S. CONST. art. III (requiring a Supreme 
Court, but not lower courts, as a judicial branch of government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting 
power to Congress to set up lower courts).  Nevertheless, even without a lower federal court system, 
this power would not belong to the Supreme Court in the first instance, but to the state courts, who 
would, and do today (in most cases) have the same responsibility as the federal lower courts do to 
check the Court from below.   See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”).   
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Second, the unquestioned role of the Supreme Court in promulgating 
procedural requirements for the federal courts is a poor basis for the 
expansion of the Court’s role into a substantive legislative one.  Such an 
expansion can be rejected solely based on the distinction between procedural 
and substantive rules, along with the reality that the Court does not even 
possess its procedural rule promulgation power absent compliance with the 
Rules Enabling Act, a delegation of legislative authority from Congress.200  It 
is important to remember that the Supreme Court’s role in promulgating 
procedural requirements is not truly a “legislative” role.  The Federal Rules 
are subject to legislative approval, and the Court’s rulemaking power is 
expressly limited to rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any 
substantive right.”201  Thus, the Court’s rulemaking power, rather than 
forming an analogical basis for affording the dicta of its decisions (especially 
its decisions as to “substantive” law) greater deference, actually forms a basis 
for the opposite proposition.     
A better argument for the quasi-legislative role of the Supreme Court 
focuses on the development of constitutional procedural requirements, such 
as those for justiciability, the Miranda warning, and the congressional duty to 
make an adequate record of constitutional violations before legislating 
prophylactically under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment (what 
Henry Monaghan famously termed the “constitutional common law”).202  
However, the decisions of the Court establishing, for example, requirements 
of standing or the Miranda warning refute the argument that the Court 
therefore has the duty or power to act legislatively even in these areas.  The 
standing cases, for example, all developed in the traditional judicial fashion—
in cases that presented plaintiffs lacking concrete and particularized injuries 
that were causally linked to the alleged actions of a defendant, and/or which 
were subject to judicial redress.203  And the same is true for Miranda v. 
Arizona,204  the right to court-appointed counsel, et cetera.  These decisions 
counsel for a stricter approach to holding and dicta in the lower courts, not 
a more deferential one.   
Finally, the limited nature of the Supreme Court’s docket is no 
justification for allowing it to assume a more legislative role by requiring 
lower courts to treat its dicta as binding (or by way of its equivalent, the 
preservation of a norm among lower court judges to do so).  As an initial 
 
 200 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2072 (2012).  
 201 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).   
 202 See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976) 
(establishing, defining, and defending the idea of constitutional common law).   
 203 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62 (4th ed. 2011) 
(discussing standing doctrine).   
 204 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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matter, one must recognize that the size of the Supreme Court’s docket is 
overwhelmingly discretionary—the Court could, at any time, increase the 
number of cases far beyond the 80 or so it currently decides each year.  Thus, 
if the Court collectively feels constrained in fulfilling its iterative law-
development role, it has the remedy within its own grasp.205   
Beyond this simple practical concern, though, lies a more theoretical 
justification for the limited docket of the Court.  The finite nature of judicial 
resources and the limited time in which the Court must do its business ought 
to operate as an assurance that the Court will select for its review only truly 
“national” questions—circuit splits, important issues of rights violations in 
the states, and structural constitutional issues—not mere “error correction” 
cases.206  The idea that only the Court’s holdings in such cases should be 
treated as binding places an important check on the temptation of any 
Supreme Court Justice to prospectively “settle” all conceivable aspects of 
such national issues for all time, even where the case does not present most 
of them.   
These points take on special significance where the Supreme Court 
decides a case by articulating a rights-limiting categorical rule, as it did in 
Garcetti.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Garcetti, a plaintiff in Mr. Ceballos’s 
shoes would have had to fight an uphill battle to have his claim recognized.207  
The well-understood interests of a public legal employer to ensure the 
correctness and competence of the written legal work of its employees would 
have provided it with broad discretion to regulate that work, and the Garcetti 
defendants would almost certainly have won their Supreme Court case on 
that ground.   
But the defendants would have had to make their showing of a 
managerial interest strongly enough to override Mr. Ceballos’s speech 
interests and the corollary interests of the public in receiving that speech.  At 
a minimum, the employer would likely would have had to establish that the 
content of the speech damaged the mission of the District Attorney’s Office 
 
 205 But see Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1219, 1219–20 (2012) (presenting an empirical analysis tending to show that the 
shrinking docket is the result of ideological polarization and the removal by Congress of much of 
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction).  Notwithstanding this study and others like it, the 
Court’s members do retain significant discretion to increase their docket.  They need only come to 
agreement to do so, and if they do not, at least in part due to political ideology trumping the need 
for law development, then expanding the scope of their lawmaking power in individual cases by 
softening the distinction between holding and dicta would seem a particularly poor remedy.   
 206 See Chad Oldfather, Error Correction 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (discussing how courts move on from 
cases without errors).   
 207 See Nahmod, supra note 22 (discussing how the Garcetti decision limited the First Amendment); 
Secunda, supra note 21 (discussing how Garcetti adopted the foundational principle that public 
employees must either be categorized as employees or citizens).  
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in fact, rather than in theory or assumedly, as the Garcetti Court opined.208  In 
reducing the inquiry to a single question—whether Mr. Ceballos spoke 
pursuant to an official job duty—the Court made it so no plaintiff in Mr. 
Ceballos’s shoes would ever have the right to demand such a showing.  In so 
doing, the Court limited the rights of all such prospective First Amendment 
plaintiffs from the rights that they possessed under the status quo ante.  The 
Court certainly had the power to make such a change, which merely was a 
choice between the constructive elements of rules and standards.  But how 
the Court chose to defend and justify its rule only amplified the concerns 
discussed above relating to the lower courts’ undue deference toward 
Supreme Court dicta.   
B.  Vertical Separation of Powers 
The Honorable Pierre Leval, a judge on the Second Circuit, commented 
in a public address on the tendency of lower courts to apply Supreme Court 
dicta as case holdings:  “Anything the Supreme Court says should be 
considered with care; nonetheless, there is a significant difference between 
statements about the law, which courts should consider with care and 
respect, and utterances which have the force of binding law.”209  Judge Leval 
justified this distinction based on the constitutional functions of the judicial 
branch, and that more familiar, “horizontal” view of the separation of 
powers is almost all of the justification that was necessary.   
But the separation of powers also has a “vertical” dimension within the 
judiciary, which, unlike the legislative and executive branches, is composed 
of a hierarchy of decision makers, each beholden to the one above it.210  This 
vertical separation of powers dimension calls upon the members of the lower 
echelons in the hierarchy to “check” those on the higher echelons when they 
act outside their authority.  In the judiciary, that “check” exists in an 
adherence to the distinction between holding and dicta.   
 
 208 See Scott R. Bauries, The Logic of Speech and Religion Rights in the Public Workplace, 19 MARQUETTE 
BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (criticizing the Garcetti decision on this basis).   
 209 Leval, supra note 24, at 1274 (2006).   
 210 Cf. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999).  Professor Nourse 
introduces the conception of the separation of powers in a vertical dimension, which illustrates 
effects that shifting duties among the three federal branches have on the states and the people and 
aids in understanding how horizontal conflicts might be resolved more realistically.  Id. at 751–52.  
The vertical view offered in this Article is distinct from Nourse’s conception because it focuses on 
internal verticality within one branch.  But it is also consistent with Nourse’s overall project—as 
higher courts assume legislative authority by articulating legal rules beyond the cases and 
controversies before them, whether through the consideration of non-pertinent hypotheticals or the 
phenomenon of over-justification, this shift in power has the effect of moving law development 
away from the people.  Lower courts can help police this shift by checking the higher courts from 
below within their own vertical dimension.   
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Where the Supreme Court goes beyond a case that it, in its discretion, 
has accepted for review, the Court has assumed a power that it does not 
possess—the power of generative, rather than iterative, lawmaking.211  The 
judicial power under the Constitution is not one of prospective, general 
lawmaking—that power is clearly and explicitly designated as a power of the 
legislative branch.212  Of course, all courts make law, but their efforts in doing 
so are efforts at resolving “cases” and “controversies” one by one—the power 
that the Constitution explicitly designates as “the judicial power.”213  Where 
judges make law, then, they properly do so iteratively, as a means of resolving 
particular disputes, not generatively, as a means of prospectively governing 
transactions and occurrences unlike the ones necessitating the court’s 
decision.214   
Similarly, where appellate courts dress their holdings up with 
justifications that either muddy the waters, as Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Garcetti did, or take account of hypothetical issues not before the court, they 
assume power to, essentially, decide matters without taking full responsibility 
for deciding them.215  Vertical stare decisis, then, can operate as a limiting 
principle in the realm of categorical rules.216  All that needs happen is for 
lower courts to read appellate courts’ rules—and especially the Supreme 
Court’s rules—carefully and hold those courts to what they have established, 
and no more.  In this way, the lower courts can act as a check on the Supreme 
Court, and the circuit courts, when those courts seek to frame their decisions 
articulating rules in ways that obfuscate what those rules actually are.  
Cabining rhetoric above is a necessary precondition for cabining discretion 
below. 
 
 211 See Leval, supra note 24, at 1250 (“We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through 
utterance of dictum made to look like a holding—in disguises, so to speak.  When we do so, we seek 
to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess.”).   
 212 Id. at 1259. 
 213 Id.   
 214 For a thoughtful discussion of generative lawmaking within a dispute resolution process, see 
generally Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political 
Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).   
 215 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (“It is a maxim not to be 
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case 
in which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought 
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.  The 
reason of this maxim is obvious.  The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, 
and considered in its full extent.  Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered 
in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom 
completely investigated.”).  
 216 Leval, supra note 24, at 1282.   
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C.  Neoformalist Constitutional Construction and the Judicial Craft 
However, it is not clear that the lower courts are up to this task.  The 
pervious Sections discuss several justifications that commentators have offered 
for allowing the Supreme Court to define its holdings as broadly as it chooses.  
As the analysis shows, each of these justifications fails, but the fact that these 
justifications exist lends credence to the idea that lower courts are currently 
oriented to give undue respect to every Supreme Court utterance.217  The 
broad misapplication of the Garcetti rule in the lower courts supports this 
view.218  In the context of categorical rule development, this deference is 
dangerous, as it presents the possibility—even the likelihood—that any errant 
statement in a majority opinion seeking to justify the Court’s rule in another 
way can be construed as another dimension of the rule itself, even if a 
selectively quoted section of that justification contradicts the rule itself—as the 
“owes its existence” and “course of performing” dicta did in Garcetti.   
Lane illustrates very clearly that this danger portends significant confusion 
and uncertainty in the application of a categorical rule in the lower courts—
directly contracting the neoformalist values underlying the choice of rules 
over standards.  Thus, appellate judges—and especially Supreme Court 
Justices—who seek to develop constitutional doctrine through categorical 
rules should take care to minimize fodder for the justifications above.   
This is especially true where the Court articulates a categorical rule that 
limits constitutional rights protections.  Because the Garcetti rule is a rights-
limiting rule, the circuit courts’ expansive applications of it had the especially 
pernicious effect of further limiting rights, and in a way that faithful readers of 
the Garcetti decision would not have been able to predict ex ante.  Considering 
the goals of neoformalist constitutional construction—to foster greater 
predictability and uniformity in the law by cabining judicial discretion—this 
set of results ought to be of concern.  If the Court’s majority crafted the 
Garcetti rule with these neoformalist goals in mind, but the lower courts 
nevertheless went on to apply the rule directly contrary to the reservations, 
caveats, and boundaries the Court placed around the rule, then one might 
reasonably question the usefulness of categorical rule development in 
furthering neoformalist goals.   
The remedy for this problem is judicial clarity.  Those who truly adhere 
to the neoformalist values must nevertheless internalize a healthy skepticism 
of the lower courts’ own adherence to their concomitant responsibility to 
check the Court from below through strong stare decisis norms and an 
adherence to the holding-dicta distinction.  The mistake in Garcetti was in the 
majority’s speaking only to the dissenters and the respondent, rather than to 
 
 217 Id. at 1274. 
 218 See supra Part II (reviewing Garcetti and is misapplication in the lower courts).   
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the lower courts that would have to apply the case’s rule.  Greater attention 
to the task in which the Court was engaged—the development of a rule that 
would then have to be applied in numerous subsequent cases below—would 
likely have yielded an opinion of more brevity, and more clarity.  Unless 
lower courts broadly show greater attentiveness to their duty to check the 
Court from below, the Court’s remaining neoformalists (and those leaning 
that way) must do so for them.   
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion is somewhat aimed at a judicial audience—
particularly a judicial audience with neoformalist tendencies or sympathies, 
one that prefers rules to standards where possible.  It argues for two changes 
in judicial practice.  One is for appellate judges sitting in the “construction 
zone”—and especially Justices of the Supreme Court so situated—to take 
special care in crafting categorical rules of decision to be applied in the lower 
courts.  Based on the Garcetti experience, lower courts can become confused 
by opinions that over-justify the Court’s holdings, using inconsistent terms 
that either expand or contract what the Court intends to hold.  In the case of 
a restriction on constitutional rights, the Court should take special care not 
to issue a holding that recognizes a restriction on rights, but then justify that 
restriction using language that arguably broadens it—no matter how clear 
the initial articulation of the restriction.  This sort of judicial carelessness not 
only leads to misapplication in the lower courts, but this misapplication also 
has the deleterious effect of even further restricting rights.   
This Article’s argument also counsels for deliberate attention in the lower 
federal courts to rediscovering their vertical separation of powers function of 
checking the Court from below.  The courts can do so by adhering to a 
stricter version of the holding-dicta distinction as to Supreme Court opinions 
than that which they have applied thus far to Garcetti.  Such adherence might 
first be applied in the context of rights-limiting categorical rules, such as the 
rule recognized in Garcetti.  There, the case for less deference to errata in the 
Supreme Court’s opinions is by far the strongest, as any expansion of a rights-
limiting rule inherently contracts the scope of rights even further.   
Even outside the more obvious context of a rights-limiting categorical 
rule, however, it is important that lower court judges understand that 
separation of powers works both vertically and horizontally, and that the 
lower courts are often the sole means of checking otherwise unchecked 
expansions of lawmaking power in the Supreme Court.  Even a decision that 
establishes a factor-based standard can needlessly decide issues that the case 
before the Court does not present or provide plausible grounds for lower 
courts to read the decision that way.  It is important, when that occurs, for 
lower courts to recognize that their adjudicatory discretion has not been 
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constrained on these matters further than the facts of the case will permit.   
But one might reasonably ask at this point whether the lower courts 
would even want to rediscover that power.  Given the extremely lopsided 
treatment the Garcetti rule has received, with many more lower court 
decisions expanding on its terms than adhering to its narrow scope, it may 
be that the federal judiciary is content to allow the Court’s errata to expand 
the Court’s rulings whenever possible—at least until a corrective such as Lane 
comes along.  In fact, based on Garcetti’s progeny, the majority of current 
judges may even be eager to see this happen.  If so, then conscientious 
adherents to neoformalist preferences—at least when sitting in the portion of 
the “construction zone” where choices must be made between rules and 
standards—would do well to limit, or even completely eliminate or de-
legitimate, errata in rule-choosing decisions, articulating the holding clearly 
and specifically, and eschewing all justifications not strictly necessary to it.  
Failing that, these adherents may see virtue in preferring standards to rules.   
